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A Comparative Approach to Economic 
Espionage: Is Any Nation Effectively 
Dealing With This Global Threat? 
MELANIE REID* 
In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA), 18 U.S.C. Sections 1831 and 1832, to help thwart at-
tempts by foreign entities intent on stealing U.S. proprietary 
information and trade secrets. Despite the passage of the 
EEA almost twenty years ago, if recent statistics are to be 
believed, there is so much trade secret thievery going around 
that the United States finds itself in the midst of an epidemic 
of economic espionage. Currently, any and all U.S. technol-
ogy that is vulnerable and profitable is being targeted. Un-
fortunately, existing remedies and enforcement have barely 
blunted the onslaught against the U.S. which faces, accord-
ing to the IP Commission Report, a potential 300 billion dol-
lar loss of raw innovation every year. To date, there have 
only been a handful of § 1831 convictions since the Act was 
passed.  That is hardly a deterrence or something to send 
shudders down the backs of would-be industrial spies.  De-
spite U.S. shortcomings, the rest of the world has not done 
any better.  
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of 
Law. I would like to thank Bethany Thompson and Gordon Russell for their in-
valuable research assistance, Andrea Dennis, Shawn Boyne, Timothy Webster, 
Akram Faizer, Bruce Beverly, and Syd Beckman for their excellent editorial com-
ments, and Pat Laflin who is an expert in this field. Additional thanks goes to all 
the SEALS 2015 Conference participants who provided me with significant com-
ments and advice during my presentation of this paper. 
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This article explores the reasons behind the U.S. govern-
ment’s two-pronged approach: preventing the thefts by edu-
cating and training private companies to improve security 
and safeguard their secrets, and reacting to acts of economic 
espionage by federally prosecuting offenders under the EEA, 
and why this approach is not succeeding. The U.S. approach 
has been weak for several reasons: (1) the EEA, specifically, 
18 U.S.C. § 1831, has been difficult to prove; (2) the sen-
tences under § 1831 have been minimal; (3) despite being 
educated on the pitfalls of lax cybersecurity and personnel 
controls, there is a lack of buy-in from private industry to 
cooperate with law enforcement and/or tighten office secu-
rity measures to prevent IP theft; (4) the federal government 
has taken a relatively hands-off approach in assisting pri-
vate enterprise; and (5) other countries do not assist in in-
ternational investigations due to their own weak response or 
individual attitudes towards intellectual property theft or in 
some cases, are the same foreign countries involved in the 
theft. This article also examines how various countries are 
handling the economic espionage threat and how differences 
in cultural, historical, and nationalistic backgrounds as well 
as economic and political governance allow some countries 
to be unapologetic supporters of state-sponsored economic 
espionage. The overall global response to economic espio-
nage is weak, and a stronger U.S. response is needed.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
“Our workers are the most productive on Earth, and if the play-
ing field is level, I promise you—America will always win.” 
– Pres. Barack Obama1 
 
When Americans are asked the question, what is the single, 
greatest foreign threat to our nation’s economic health and stability, 
many will say it is the transfer of American manufacturing jobs to 
other countries such as China and Korea. While it is true that mil-
lions of manufacturing jobs have been moved overseas,2 there is an 
                                                                                                             
 1 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY OF MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 
7 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_
strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [hereinafter TRADE 
SECRETS]. 
 2 PETER NAVARRO & GREG AUTRY, DEATH BY CHINA: CONFRONTING THE 
DRAGON—A GLOBAL CALL TO ACTION (Prentice Hall 2011). “Since China joined 
the World Trade Organization in 2001 and falsely promised to end its mercantilist 
and protectionist practices, America’s apparel, textile, and wood furniture indus-
tries have shrunk to half their size—with textile jobs alone beaten down by 70%. 
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even greater threat to our nation’s economic productivity and pros-
perity: economic espionage. 
Economic espionage occurs when a foreign power sponsors or 
coordinates intelligence activity directed at another government, a 
foreign corporation, establishment, or person.3 This intelligence ac-
tivity is “designed to unlawfully or clandestinely . . . obtain sensitive 
financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary eco-
nomic information; or critical technologies[,] or to unlawfully or 
clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions.”4 An 
employee’s unwitting act of opening an electronic attachment con-
taining a malicious virus meant to infiltrate the company’s server or 
a trusted insider who deliberately downloads his employer’s source 
code for personal gain and for the benefit of a foreign entity can 
harm the employer and may cost their company millions or even 
billions of dollars.5 
The term “economic espionage” sounds mysterious and perhaps 
a bit “cloak and dagger.” One can imagine a covert foreign agent 
tasked with committing economic espionage stopping by a dead 
drop to retrieve a package containing the latest blueprints or proto-
type designs that a General Electric employee has left behind for his 
handler. However, one who commits economic espionage needs no 
covert moves to be successful. 
In reality, economic espionage is merely a form of cheating—
stealing trade secrets from one company in order to assist a state-
                                                                                                             
Other critical industries like chemicals, paper, steel, and tires are under similar 
siege, while employment in our high-tech computer and electronics manufactur-
ing industries has plummeted by more than 40%.” Id. at 2–3. 
 3 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ECON. ESPIONAGE, 
PROTECTING AMERICA’S TRADE SECRETS, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investi-
gate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage-1. Industrial espionage is similar to 
economic espionage in that it involves the theft of trade secrets, however, indus-
trial espionage does not involve a foreign power, instrumentality, or agent. Id. at 
2. 
 4 The FBI Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2015) https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs. 
 5 “Cyber espionage is the science of covertly capturing e-mail traffic, text 
messages, other electronic communications, and corporate data for the purpose of 
gathering national-security or commercial intelligence.” Seymour M. Hersh, The 
Online Threat: Should we be worried about a cyber war?, THE NEW YORKER, 
Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/01/the-online-
threat. 
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sponsored foreign entity skip its research and development (R&D) 
phase (or at least, accelerate the process) and proceed straight to 
making money for its stakeholders and boost that country’s econ-
omy. What makes this form of cheating “espionage” is that typi-
cally, one foreign nation is deprived of its trade secrets while another 
benefits from its neighbor’s sweat equity. 
In 1996, the United States’ Congress determined that this is a 
crime.6 Some nations agree, others condemn the activity but let the 
civil courts handle these issues, and other nations condone it—all is 
fair in love, war, and business.7 One nation’s political and military 
ally can also be that country’s economic competitor/adversary at the 
same time. 
While the threat may sound exaggerated, it is not. Estimates 
vary, but economic espionage costs the United States’ government 
and the private sector somewhere between $2 to $400 billion annu-
ally.8 Symantec, an American technology security company, esti-
mates that industrial espionage costs United States’ businesses more 
than $250 billion each year.9 Others have calculated that cyber espi-
onage, in particular, costs the U.S. economy from 0.1 percent to 0.5 
percent of its gross domestic product.10 
                                                                                                             
 6 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488. 
 7 Siobhan Gorman, China Singled Out for Cyberspying, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203
716204577015540198801540. 
 8 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in 2009 that as much 
as $50 billion was lost due to espionage, cyber attacks and other counterfeit and 
trademark crimes. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., 
FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 
2009-2011 (2011) [hereinafter COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT]. See also David 
Cotriss, Blame Game: Cyber Espionage, SC MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.scmagazine.com//blame-game-cyber-espionage/printarticle/316384/. 
 9 Cotriss, supra note 8. See also MCAFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L 
STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME (2014), 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cyber-
crime2.pdf. 
 10 Ellen Nakashima, Obama Orders Voluntary Security Standards for Criti-
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During a Senate hearing in 2014, Representative Mike Rogers, 
chair of the House Intelligence Committee and chairman of the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, stated that the theft of 
proprietary information and technology constitutes “the largest 
transfer of wealth . . . in the world’s history”11 and has cost the 
                                                                                                             
  The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property reports 
that annual U.S. economic losses from international IP theft are “likely to be com-
parable to the current annual level of U.S. exports to Asia, [which is estimated at] 
over $300 billion.” COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., THE IP 
COMMISSION REPORT 2 (2013). “[F]ormed in 2012, [the Commission on the Theft 
of American Intellectual Property is] ‘an independent initiative representing the 
sectors of research, defense, academia, government, labor, and business. The 
Commission is dedicated to examining the causes and impact of IP theft on U.S. 
strategic and economic interests and recommending policy solutions to the Ad-
ministration and Congress.’” Scott Bradner, IP Commission Report: Surprisingly 
Clueful, NETWORK WORLD (May 30, 2013), http://www.networkworld.com/arti-
cle/2166743/software/ip-commission-report--surprisingly-clueful.html. A threat 
assessment statement from 2015 outlining the top risks to national security found 
that dangers from foreign spies and from leakers “are increasing in frequency, 
scale, sophistication, and severity of impact.” Worldwide Threat Assessment of 
the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before Senate Armed Services Comm., 
114th Cong. 1–3 (2015) (statement for the record of James R. Clapper, Director 
of National Intelligence), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassi-
fied_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf. According to Clapper’s statement, 
the top threats in 2014 included: 1) cyberattacks, cyberespionage, 2) terrorism and 
transnational organized crime, 3) Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, 4) 
counterintelligence, and 5) counterspace (attacks on satellites, communications). 
Id. 
 11 Hilary Tuttle, Counterintelligence Now Riskier than Terrorism, Intelli-
gence Officials Report, RISK MANAGEMENT MONITOR (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/counterintelligence-now-riskier-than-
terrorism-intelligence-officials-report/. An economist and director of the U.S. 
Cyber Consequences Unit, a non-profit research institute, has said, “While a pre-
cise dollar figure for damage is elusive, the overall magnitude of the attacks is 
not. We’re talking about stealing entire industries. This may be the biggest trans-
fer of wealth in a short period of time that the world has ever seen.” Michael Riley 
& John Walcott, China-Based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold 
War, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2011-12-13/china-based-hacking-of-760-companies-re-
flects-undeclared-global-cyber-war. This is a common phrase used by those de-
scribing the impact of economic espionage. The cybersecurity “firm McAfee de-
tailed hacks into some 72 public and private computer networks in 14 countries 
[in a report in August 2011] and [also] warned of ‘the biggest transfer of wealth 
in terms of intellectual property in history.’” Adam Piore, Digital Spies: The 
Alarming Rise of Electronic Espionage, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 24, 2012), 
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United States an estimated $2 trillion.12 One thing is certain, the 
United States would stand to gain millions of jobs and see a dramatic 
increase in GDP growth, R&D investment, and increased worker 
productivity and innovation in a world where economic espionage 
disappeared and a respect for intellectual property existed. Pens, pa-
pers, files, and document storage rooms are a thing of the past. We 
currently live in an age of malware13, botnets14, rootkits,15 zero-
                                                                                                             
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/how-to/a7488/digital-
spies-the-alarming-rise-of-electronic-espionage/. 
 12 See Tuttle, supra note 11. See also Ann. Open Hearing on Current and 
Projected National Security Threats to the U. S.: Hearing Before Senate Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 4–7, 12–14 (2014) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ing] (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). This 
threat assessment report outlines the top risks to national security. The report says 
dangers from foreign spies and leakers have increased in frequency and severity. 
 13 Malware can be embedded on microchips purchased by a company and 
used to exfiltrate information from computers. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–8 
(2011) (statement of Gordon Snow, Assistant Dir., Cyber Div., Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation). 
 14 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING 
IN CYBERSPACE (Jul. 2011). “Botnets are networks of compromised computers 
controlled remotely by an attacker. The botnets run by criminals could be used by 
cyber terrorists or nation states to steal sensitive data, raise funds, limit attribution 
of cyber attacks, or disrupt access to critical national infrastructure. Botnets that 
specialize in data exfiltration are able to capture the contents of encrypted 
webpages and modify them in real time. When properly configured, criminals can 
ask additional questions at login or modify the data displayed on the screen to 
conceal ongoing criminal activity.” Snow, supra note 13. 
 15 Thomas Brewster, Russians Suspected in ‘Uroburos’ Digital Espionage 
Attacks, TECH WEEK EUROPE (Mar. 3, 2014, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/workspace/russian-intelligence-uroburos-
malware-140494 (quoting Jaime Blasco, director of AlienVault Labs). A “root 
kit” is a type of malware that “hides the presence of the spying operation and also 
creates a hidden, encrypted file system to store stolen data and tools used by the 
attackers. Those tools include password stealers, tiny programs for gathering in-
formation about the system and document stealers.” Id; Peter Apps & Jim Finkle, 
Insight – Suspected Russian Spyware Turla Targets Europe, U.S., REUTERS (Mar. 
7, 2014, 2:31 PM), uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/russia-cyberespionage-
idUKL1N0M302H20140307. 
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day,16 honeypots,17 cybercriminal threats, advanced persistent 
threats (APTs)18 and computer network exploitation. It is relatively 
easy for nation states to either steal trade secrets via the internet or 
to find an insider who will steal it for them. These significant and 
repeated threats should raise our ire and cause entrepreneurs to take 
a second look at their electronic encryption process or personnel se-
curity measures. Yet surprisingly, most Americans remain either in-
different to this present and persistent threat, lulled into a false sense 
of security due to the inadequate protective measures already in 
place, or resigned to the possibility of technology loss through theft 
as just another cost of doing business. Their concerns only become 
truly real when it becomes personal, when it is their company trade 
secrets that are looted. 
Foreign competitors steal trade secrets in a variety of ways—
through targeting and recruiting insiders, conducting economic in-
telligence operations through the use of bribery, cyber intrusions, 
theft, and dumpster diving in search of intellectual property or dis-
carded prototypes, and establishing joint ventures with U.S. compa-
nies.19 Foreign competitors will also utilize unsolicited emails to tar-
                                                                                                             
 16 Zero-day refers to a Windows software flaw that was used by Russian gov-
ernment-linked hackers to install malicious software to conduct a large-scale 
cyber-spying program on NATO, U.S. government agencies, and European coun-
tries. Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/hackers-breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-
5ef7-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251_story.html. 
 17 Economic Espionage professionals defined “Honeypots” as “intelligence 
operations in which a younger sexual partner is used to seduce and suborn a target 
with access to secret information.” Susan Waterman, U.S. Defense Contractor 
Arrested for Passing Secrets to Chinese ‘Honeypot,’ WASHINGTON TIMES (March 
19, 2013) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/19/us-defense-con-
tractor-arrested-passing-secrets-chi/?paige=all. 
 18 An “advanced persistent threat” is considered “an onslaught of computer 
network intrusions originating from Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in China.” 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5. The Department of Defense 
has characterized China as “the world’s most active and persistent perpetrator of 
economic espionage.” Cotriss, supra note 8. 
 19 Economic Espionage And Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate For 
Today’s Threats? Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on 
Crime and Terrorism, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Coleman Statement] 
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get insiders or plant a computer virus, establish front companies, li-
aison with universities that have ties to defense contractors, have 
foreign intelligence agents attempt to recruit insiders, serve as hosts 
or attendees at trade conferences, infiltrate research and facilities re-
located overseas, circumvent export control laws, visit scientific and 
research delegations, and of course, hack into private company da-
tabases.20 
The United States government recognizes that economic espio-
nage is a huge problem, so it has taken steps to combat and protect 
against this threat. But are these protective measures sufficient to 
thwart or mitigate the problem? Should the United States reverse 
course and follow the path of other nations, which steal foreign in-
tellectual property and share the pilfered trade secrets with their own 
state-run industries and corporations? Or should we simply look the 
other way like other countries appear to be doing? This article ex-
amines how various countries deal with the economic espionage 
threat and how these measures compare to the U.S. response; it seeks 
to explore how differences in national pride, cultural, historical and 
nationalistic backgrounds, and economic and political governance 
allow some countries to be unapologetic supporters of state-spon-
sored economic espionage. Part II evaluates the U.S. government 
response and how other countries handle the issue of economic es-
pionage, which countries have chosen to criminalize these acts and 
which countries condemn but do not criminalize. Part III identifies 
the leading offender nations and how cultural attitudes toward prop-
erty rights and the type of political governance contribute to an ac-
ceptance of economic espionage. Part IV attempts to explain why 
the overall global response to economic espionage is weak, why the 
issue is more complicated than it seems at first glance, and why a 
strong U.S. response is needed. 
                                                                                                             
(statement of Randall C. Coleman, Assistant Dir. Counterintelligence Div., Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation). 
 20 FBI NATIONAL PRESS OFFICE, FBI ANNOUNCES ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
AWARENESS CAMPAIGN (2015); Coleman Statement, supra note 19. 
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II.   GLOBAL SOLUTIONS TO COMBAT ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
A.   The United States’ Response 
The U.S. government is currently using a two-pronged approach 
to combat economic espionage by: (1) preventing the thefts by edu-
cating and training private companies to improve security and safe-
guard their secrets, and (2) reacting to acts of economic espionage 
by federally prosecuting offenders.21 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the leading agency 
responsible for combatting economic espionage. In fact, counteres-
pionage22 has become their number two priority second only to ter-
rorism.23 Intellectual property theft not only costs businesses money, 
but it is also considered a strategic threat—a threat to our nation’s 
economic and security interests.24 
                                                                                                             
 21 See generally COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND 
TRADE SECRET THEFT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND POLICY 
RESPONSES (2013). 
 22 Counterespionage includes corporate counterintelligence, which is consid-
ered the reverse form of business espionage and business intelligence. Its main 
purpose is to protect business information from those who are not authorized to 
receive it, to counter potential threats, and to enhance security. See Steve White-
head, Corporate Counterintelligence—Protecting Business Information, 
COMPUTER BUS. REV. (June 1, 2013), http://www.cbr.co.za/regular.aspx?pklReg-
ularId=1390. 
 23 “F.B.I. Director Robert Mueller designated espionage as the F.B.I.’s num-
ber two priority.” Investigative Programs Counterintelligence Division, The Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (Last visited Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://www2.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm. See also A New F.B.I. Focus: H.R. 
Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. for the Dep’t of Commerce, Justice, and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 
Mueller Testimony] (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI), 
https://www2.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/mueller062102.htm. “The Economic 
Espionage Unit is dedicated to countering the economic espionage threat to in-
clude developing training and outreach materials; participating in conferences; 
visiting private industry; working with law enforcement and intelligence commu-
nity on requirement issues; and providing specific classified and unclassified 
presentations.” Investigative Programs Counterintelligence Division, supra. 
 24 As noted during a hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Crime while discussing the Economic Espionage Act bill, “threats to the nation’s 
economic interest are threats to the nation’s vital security interests.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996). Some, including former F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh, 
have called economic espionage “the greatest threat to [the United States] since 
the Cold War.” Alan Gathright & Vanessa Hua, Tech Theft Rises Amid China 
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The FBI continually organizes training sessions and initiates 
working partnerships with the private sector to educate companies 
and universities as to potential weaknesses in their security systems 
whether these deficiencies be personnel and/or computer-related.25 
Their strategy of reaching out to the private sector, participating in 
seminars, round table discussions, making training films on the is-
sue, and meeting with private industry stakeholders has been rela-
tively successful in spreading the word as to damaging effects of 
economic espionage. 26 
                                                                                                             
Ties, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Tech-
theft-rises-amid-China-ties-Growing-2635355.php. 
 25 See COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 21. See also U.S.-CHINA 
ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 113TH CONG., REP. TO CONGRESS (Comm. Print 
2013), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2013-annual-report-con-
gress. 
 26 Economic Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and 
Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and In-
telligence of the H.R. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 16–19 (2012) 
(statement of C. Frank Figliuzzi, Assistant Dir., Counterintelligence Div., Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Figliuzzi Testimony]. 
“To address the evolving Insider Threat, the FBI has become more proactive to 
prevent losses of information and technology. CD continues expanding our out-
reach and liaison alliances to government agencies, the defense industry, aca-
demic institutions, and, for the first time, to the general public, because of an in-
creased targeting of unclassified trade secrets across all American industries and 
sectors. On May 11, 2012, the FBI launched a media campaign highlighting the 
Insider Threat relating to economic espionage. This campaign included print and 
television interviews, billboards along busy commuter corridors in nine leading 
research areas nationwide, and public information on the FBI Web site. Through 
this campaign, the FBI hopes to reach the public and business communities by 
explaining how the Insider Threat affects a company’s operations and educating 
them on how to detect, prevent, and respond to threats to their organizations’ pro-
prietary information. Perhaps the most important among these is identifying and 
taking defensive measures against employees stealing trade secrets.” Id. 
“In February 2013, the Bureau held the first session of our National Cyber Exec-
utive Institute, a three-day seminar to train leading industry executives on cyber 
threat awareness and information sharing. One example of an effective public-
private partnership is the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance, a 
proven model for sharing private sector information in collaboration with law en-
forcement. Located in Pittsburgh, the alliance includes more than 80 industry part-
ners from a range of sectors, including financial services, telecommunications, 
retail and manufacturing. The members of the alliance work together with federal 
and international partners to provide real-time threat intelligence, every day. An-
other initiative the FBI participates in, the Enduring Security Framework, includes 
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Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act “(EEA)” in 
199627 to much fanfare. The United States was tired of “the system-
atic pilfering of our country’s economic secrets by our trading part-
ners which undermines our economic security”28 and wanted to 
communicate that we, as a society, morally condemn this type of 
crime—a crime that is punishable by a maximum of fifteen years in 
prison.29 Prior to 1996, those stealing trade secrets were prosecuted 
using a variety of different federal statutes, including mail and wire 
fraud and the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property.30 How-
ever, the Supreme Court later ruled that trade secrets were not prop-
erty, and thus, it was inappropriate to use the Interstate Transporta-
tion of Stolen Property statute to prosecute a number of these 
crimes.31 Therefore, when former President Bill Clinton signed the 
Economic Espionage Act in 1996, it was the first time the FBI had 
a specific criminal statute with which to fight this particular prob-
lem. 
The statute has since been amended to increase the fines that can 
be imposed, from $500,000 to $5 million in the case of an individual 
and from $10 million to not more than the greater of $10 million or 
three times the value of the stolen trade secret.32 This reflects Con-
gress’ continued emphasis and focus on the severity of the crime.33 
                                                                                                             
top leaders from the private sector and the federal government. This partnership 
illustrates that the way forward on cyber security is not just about sharing infor-
mation, but also about solving problems together.” Threats to the Homeland: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
fairs, 113th Cong. 7–9 (2013) (statement of James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau 
of Investigation). 
 27 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, §101, 110 Stat. 
3488 (1996). 
 28 142 CONG. REC. 14 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statements of Sen. Kohl & 
Sen. Spector). 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012). 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012). 
 31 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 215–18 (1985). 
 32 Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442. (2013). 
 33 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
ADMINISTRATION’S WHITE PAPER ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/ip_white_paper.pdf [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER]. In 
2011, the Administration recommended that “Congress increase the statutory 
maximum sentence for economic espionage [from 15 to] 20 years.” In addition, 
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Title 18 United States Code Section 1831 (EEA) makes it a 
crime to knowingly steal or receive a trade secret for the benefit of 
any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.34 
The term “trade secret” is described as “all forms and types of fi-
nancial, business, scientific, technical, economic or engineering in-
formation, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, 
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, pro-
cedures, programs, or codes whether tangible or intangible, and 
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, elec-
tronically, graphically, photographically or in writing.”35 Moreover, 
in order to be considered a trade secret, the owner must have “taken 
reasonable measures to keep such information secret” and the trade 
secret must have an independent economic value.36 Trade secret ex-
amples include software, marketing plans, customer lists, source 
                                                                                                             
the Administration asked Congress to direct the U.S. Sentencing Commission to 
consider increasing the guideline range based on aggravated offense conduct in 
theft of trade secret and economic espionage cases. Id. at 4–5 
 34  
(a) In General.— Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will 
benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign 
agent, knowingly— 
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or 
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret: 
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photo-
graphs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, 
transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade se-
cret: 
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have 
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authoriza-
tion: 
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) 
through (3); or 
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense de-
scribed in any of paragraphs (1) through (4), and one or more of such 
persons do any act to effect the object of conspiracy shall, except as pro-
vided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 15 years, or both. 
(b) ORGANIZATIONS. - Any organization that commits any offense 
described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10,000,000.  
Economic Espionage Act § 101, supra note 27. 
 35 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012). 
 36 Id. Therefore, a trade secret is different from a patent or copyright whereby 
owners may sue under patent or copyright laws. 
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codes, pricing information, technical drawings, and chemical for-
mulas.37 
A foreign agent is defined as “any officer, employee, proxy, 
servant, delegate, or representative of a foreign government.”38 A 
foreign instrumentality is defined as “any agency, bureau, ministry, 
component, institution, or association, or any legal, commercial, or 
business organization, corporation, firm, or entity, that is substan-
tially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed or dom-
inated by a foreign government.”39 
The territorial limits of section 1831 are relatively broad. The 
EEA protects against theft that occurs either in the United States or 
outside the United States. If the theft occurs outside the United 
States, the violator must be a U.S. person or organization or an act 
in furtherance of the offense must have been committed in the 
United States.40 
Since 1996, there have been six convictions under Section 
1831.41 On many occasions, an indictment was filed with a § 1831 
charge included, but eventually the defendant pled guilty to a lesser 
charge such as § 1832 theft of trade secrets.42 The following table 
summarizes the six § 1831 convictions:43 
 
                                                                                                             
 37 Do I Have Trade Secrets to Protect?, MAX FILINGS (last visited Nov. 4, 
2015), https://www.maxfilings.com/incorporation-knowledge-center/Trade-Se-
crets-to-protect.php. 
Trade secrets are similar to trademarks, patents, and copyrights in that they are all 
deemed intellectual property, however, trade secrets do not share the same pro-
tections as the other three. Patents, trademarks, and copyrights all give the own-
ers/creators an exclusive right to their work to distribute, copy, perform, display, 
modify, etc. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is Intellectual Prop-
erty?, (last visited Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intprop-
erty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf. 
 38 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012). 
 39 Id. 
 40 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012). 
 41 A Look at 16 Years of EEA Prosecutions, LAW 360 (Sep. 19, 2012 at 12:18 
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at-16-years-of-eea-prose-
cutions. 
 42 Id. 
 43 The author created this table by reading about these cases in the news. See 
also Offices of U.S. Att’ys, Economic Espionage and Trade Secrets, 57 U.S. 
ATT’YS BULL. (2009) and FBI, https://www.fbi.gov (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
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Year Case Name Jurisdiction Case 
Number 
Company Trade  
Secret 
Foreign Entity Country Sentence 
2006 United States 
v. Fei Ye & 
Ming Zhong 
Court of Ap-















China 1 year in 
prison 










nVSensor Royal Thai Air 
Force, Royal Ma-
laysian Air 






24 months in 
prison 














public of China 
China 188 months in 
prison, and 3 
years super-
vised release 















87 months in 
prison, 3 years 
of supervised 
release 
2011 United States 


















Israel 6 months in 
prison, 2 years 
of supervised 
release, and a 
fine of 
$25,000 
2014 United States 
v. Walter 























China 15 years in 




Other criminal statutes have also been used in this area, to in-
clude theft of trade secrets (otherwise known as industrial espio-
nage),44 mail or wire fraud,45 foreign or interstate transportation of 
stolen property46, the Export Control Act47 and the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)48, money laundering,49 and the 
                                                                                                             
 44 Section 1832 makes it a crime to knowingly perform targeting or acquisi-
tion of trade secrets or intend to convert a trade secret to knowingly benefit anyone 
other than the owner. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012). 
 45 18 U.S.C. § 1341, (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1343, (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 
(2012). 
 46 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012). 
 47 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012). 
 48 22 C.F.R. § 120. (2014). 
 49 18 U.S.C. § 1956, (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012). 
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Fraud Scheme.50 Theft of trade se-
crets under § 1832 is easier to prosecute (hence the greater amount 
of convictions compared to § 1831) due to the fact that no govern-
ment sponsorship (beneficiary) need be proven and the maximum 
sentence is ten years rather than fifteen years under § 1831. The 
number of theft of trade secrets convictions increased by more than 
sixty percent between 2009 and 2013.51 
This reactive/prosecution part of the government’s two-pronged 
strategy to combat economic espionage has had dismal results. The 
extremely small number of prosecutions has made only a minor, in-
significant dent in what is a huge, ongoing problem. 52 
B.   Other Nations’ Responses 
While the United States remains the world’s leader in research 
and development (R&D), and historically has been known for its 
innovation and cutting-edge technology, it is certainly not the only 
country to suffer from the consequences of economic espionage. In 
fact, most developed or developing countries have also been tar-
geted for technology theft. Many countries have a number of crimi-
nal or civil statutes that can be applied when their government or 
private industry are victimized.53 However, no country has a crimi-
nal statute with the specificity of §§1831 and 1832, which criminal-
ize the theft of corporate trade secrets with the exception of Canada 
and New Zealand, but more countries are considering such legisla-
tion.54 Not surprisingly, most foreign countries have a poor track 
record of successfully prosecuting acts of economic espionage. 
                                                                                                             
 50 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2012). Intrusion or hacking is criminalized under 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5). 
 51 Coleman Statement, supra note 19. This article does not touch upon the 
civil trade secret enforcement statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1838, or the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act. 
 52 “We’re about high school soccer now; we’ve spread out, we pass well, but 
the bad guys are moving at World Cup speed, so we have to get better.” Scott 
Pelley, FBI Director On Threat of ISIS, Cybercrime, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-james-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cy-
bercrime/. 
 53 See table of various countries with applicable criminal statutes infra. 
 54 See table of various countries with applicable criminal statutes infra. See 
generally GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2014 YEAR-END FRENCH LAW 
UPDATE 11 (2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-
Year-End-French-Law-Update.pdf. 
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The table below lists the various countries that have criminal 
















1. Fines, which are adjusted 
for inflation;  
2. Imprisonment from one 
month to one year; and possi-
bly, where relevant  
3. Legal disqualification 
from special professions 
from six months to three 
years.  
Any third party, so long 




Brazil Lei 9.279 
1996/Amen
ded 2013 
1. Unspecified fines; or  
2. Imprisonment for three 
months to one year. 
Any third party Yes 
Canada 




1. Imprisonment for no more 
than ten years. 
Any third party Yes 
China 
Law of Septem-













1. Unspecified fines;  
2. Imprisonment for no less 
than three years, but no more 
than seven years; and possi-
ble  
3. Administrative sanctions 
Any third party Yes 
                                                                                                             
 55 The author compiled this table by referencing the above mentioned statutes 
as well as BRADLEY LIMPERT & OXANA IATSYK, LIMPERT: TECHNOLOGY 
CONTRACTING: LAW, PRECEDENTS AND COMMENTARY § 2-3 (2008). 
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 France 









In cases where the act is com-
mitted concerning a database 
maintained by the French 
state that includes personal 
data:  
1. Fines not to exceed 
€75,000 ($81,442.50); and  
2. Imprisonment for five 
years.  
In cases where national de-
fense is compromised:  
1. Fines not to exceed 
€100,000 ($108,590); and  
2. Imprisonment for seven 
years.  
In cases where infringer is 
employee: 
1. Imprisonment of two 
years; and  
2. Fines of €30,000.  
In all other cases:  
1. Fines not to exceed 
€45,000 ($48,865.50); and 
2. Imprisonment for up to one 
year.  
Supplementary sanctions 
may be imposed at the 
court’s discretion:  
1. Deprivation of voting 
rights;  
2. Rights to be elected; and/or 
3. Rights to be a guardian of 
a child. 








In cases where one is an em-
ployee or former employee of 
the victim:  
1. Unspecified fines; or  
2. Imprisonment for up to 
three years.  
In cases where one is obli-
gated to keep the trade secret: 
1. Unspecified fines; or  
2. Imprisonment for up to 
two years.  
Any third party, or with 
the intent of causing 





Arts. 622, 623 
1996 
 
In cases where one acquired 
the secret through business: 
1. Imprisonment for up to 
three years.
 In all other cases:  
1. Fines between €100 
($108.55) and €1000 
($1,085.52); or 
2. Imprisonment for up to 
three years.  
Any third party Yes 









1. Imprisonment with labor 
for up to ten years; and/or  
2. Fines not exceeding 
¥10,000,000 ($82,529.40). In 
cases where one is an em-
ployee or former employee of 
the victim, the penalty also 
includes additional fines up 
to ¥300,000,000 
($2,476,332). 




tion and Trade 
Secret Protec-




1. Imprisonment for up to ten 
years; or  
2. Fines up to ₩100,000,000 
($89,703).  
In cases where one is using 
the secret in order to benefit a 
foreign entity:  
1. Imprisonment with labor 
for up to ten years; or 
2. Fines equivalent to the 
amount ranging from not less 
than two times to not more 
than ten times the amount of 
the profit in property.  
In all other cases:  
1. Imprisonment with labor 
for up to five years; or  
2. Fines equivalent to the 
amount ranging from not less 
than two times to not more 
than ten times the amount of 
the profit in property. 
Any third party Yes 
Russia 





1. Fines (which can include 
amount of defendant’s in-
come),  
2. Imprisonment,  
3. Deprivation of right to of-
fices, or  
4. Deprivation of rights to en-
gage in certain activities. 
Penalties are heightened if in-
fringer is employee of victim. 
Disclosure of infor-
mation not legally 
available to third par-
ties, including commer-
cial, tax or banking se-
crets to any third party 
Yes 
Switzerland
Federal Act of 
December 19, 




Imprisonment not to exceed 
three years and/or a monetary 
penalty.  
Any external official 
agency, foreign organi-
zation, private enter-








1. Fines up to three times the 
amount of actual damages,  
2. Injunctions, and/or 3. Im-
prisonment. 






- No criminal penalties 
Any unauthorized third 
party 
Yes 










1. Fines not to exceed $5 mil-
lion and/or  
2. Imprisonment not to ex-
ceed fifteen years. 
Foreign Entity No 
 
The countries that comprise the “Five Eyes,”56 an intelligence 
alliance among the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, have varying ideas as to 
what should be done about economic espionage—Canada and New 
Zealand have similar criminal statutes to the U.S., the United King-
dom has previously considered passing such legislation, and Aus-
tralia simply considers theft of trade secrets a civil matter. 
1.   CANADA 
Canada has in place an almost mirror-image copy of the U.S.’ 
EEA.57 Richard Fadden, director of the Canadian Security Intelli-
gence Service, stated in a report presented to Canadian parliament 
that state-sponsored espionage against Canada had reached “levels 
equal to, or greater than those witnessed during the Cold War.”58 
The report indicated that Canada’s “open society with strong inter-
national relationships and advanced industries such as telecommu-
nications and mining—make it attractive to foreign intelligence 
agencies.”59 “As a world leader in communications, biotechnology, 
energy extraction technologies, aerospace and other areas, Canada 
remains an attractive target for economic espionage.”60 
                                                                                                             
 56 These five countries jointly coordinate their signals intelligence and are 
bound by the U.K./U.S. agreement to share such intelligence. The Five Eyes, Pri-
vacy International (last visited Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.privacyinterna-
tional.org/node/51. 
 57 “Use of trade secret for the benefit of foreign economic entity – every per-
son commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association 
with a foreign economic entity, fraudulently and without color of right and to the 
detriment of Canada’s economic interests, international relations or national de-
fense or national security (a) communicates a trade secret to another person, group 
or organization; or (b) obtains, retains, alters or destroys a trade secret.” Security 
of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5 (Can.). 
 58 Agence France-Presse, Canada’s Spy Chief: Espionage Has Reached Cold 
War-Level, RAW STORY (June 14, 2011, 4:51 PM), http://www.raw-
story.com/2011/06/canadas-spy-chief-espionage-has-reached-cold-war-level/. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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Canada has been targeted by both Russia and China. In 2012, 
two Russian diplomats were expelled from Canada in connection 
with an espionage case against a Canadian naval officer charged un-
der the Security of Information Act, which accused the officer of 
giving “a foreign entity” secret information between 2007 and 
2012.61 The Security Act “carr[ies] a maximum penalty of life in 
prison.”62 Both Russia and Canada have an interest in the Arctic Cir-
cle where companies are exploring and mining for gold, diamonds, 
iron ore, lead, zinc, and uranium.63 
That same year, Telvent Canada Ltd., an information technology 
company catering to the energy industry, stated that attackers had 
breached its internal firewall and security systems, installed mali-
cious software, and had stolen project files related to a product that 
helps energy firms merge older IT assets with more advanced “smart 
grid” technologies.64 Chinese hackers were blamed for the breach.65 
China also has mining exploration interests in the Arctic Circle.66 
While Canada amended its Security of Information Act in 
200167 to look incredibly similar to the United States’ EEA, Canada 
has yet to complete such a prosecution under its laws.68 
                                                                                                             
 61 Russian Diplomats Left Canada Weeks Before Halifax Espionage Arrest, 
NATIONAL POST (Jan. 20, 2012), [hereinafter Russian Diplomats], http://news.na-
tionalpost.com/news/canada/russian-diplomats-left-canada-weeks-before-hali-
fax-spy-mystery. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id; David Ljunggren & Euan Rocha, Mineral-Rich Canadian Arctic Terri-
tory Poised for Major Developments, MINEWEB (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.min-
eweb.com/archive/mineral-rich-canadian-arctic-territory-poised-for-major-de-
velopments/. 
 64 Brian Krebs, Chinese Hackers Blamed for Intrusion at Energy Industry 
Giant Telvent, KREBS ON SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2012), http://krebsonsecu-
rity.com/2012/09/chinese-hackers-blamed-for-intrusion-at-energy-industry-gi-
ant-telvent. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Ljunggren & Rocha, supra note 63. 
 67 Section 19 of the Act makes it an offense for a person to “at the direction 
of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign economic entity, fraudulently 
and without colour of right” communicate a trade secret to another person, group 
or organization or obtain, retain, alter or destroy a trade secret “to the detriment 
of” Canada’s economic interests, international relations, national defense or na-
tional security. Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5 (Can.). 
 68 A thorough review of the Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-
5 (Can.) indicates no convictions under Section 19 have occurred. 
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2.   NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand amended its Crimes Act in 2003 and made intel-
lectual property/trade secret theft a crime in Section 230.69 The lan-
guage used in Section 230, “taking, obtaining, or copying of trade 
secrets,” looks similar to the United States’ theft of trade secrets of-
fense under Section 1832.70 “The intent elements require intent to 
obtain any pecuniary advantage or to cause loss to any other person, 
and acting dishonestly and without claim of right.”71 Legislative his-
tory suggests that foreign economic espionage was a primary con-
cern in passing the legislation.72 Despite its passage, its fate has gone 
the way of Canada with Section 230 having been “little used” and 
not used at all in the foreign economic espionage context.73 In fact, 
one law professor in New Zealand, Anna Kingsbury, argues that the 
problem could be dealt with in the civil legal system and that such a 
crime only encourages protection, reduces competition, and inhibits 
innovation and employee mobility.74 Kingsbury sees an economic 
espionage crime as “based in an idea of inter-country competition 
that does not fit well with contemporary understandings of the eco-
nomics of trade and theories of comparative advantage.”75 Thus, in 
a “global” marketplace, employees that steal trade secrets are actu-
ally assisting in competition and innovation on a “global” level. 
New Zealand’s Section 230 has yet to be tested. 
3.   UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom (UK), “[t]here is no statute in English 
criminal law that is specifically aimed at penalizing a person who 
misuses another’s trade secrets.”76 Moreover, the crime of theft 
                                                                                                             
 69 Anna Kingsbury, Trade Secret Crime in New Zealand Law: What Was the 
Problem and Is Criminalization the Solution?, 37 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 147, 149 
(2015). “Section 230 of the Crimes Act 1961 as amended in 2003 provides for an 
offence of taking, obtaining or copying trade secrets. The penalty on conviction 
is imprisonment for up to five years.” Id. 
 70 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012). 
 71 Kingsbury, supra note 69, at 149. 
 72 Id. at 151. 
 73 Id. at 151–52. 
 74 Id. at 152. 
 75 Id. at 153. 
 76 3 HILARY PEARSON, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 39:19 
(2014). 
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would rarely apply, as confidential information does not fall within 
the definition of “property.”77 “In the non-criminal context, how-
ever, English law [particularly breach of confidence] provides broad 
and effective protection for trade secrets through a variety of avail-
able remedies. These remedies include: search and seizure orders, 
injunctive relief, damages, accounting for profits, third party liabil-
ity, constructive trusts over assets acquired as a result of the breach 
and an order to reveal the source of the disclosed information.”78 
One consultation paper created by the UK Law Commission rec-
ommended that the UK criminalize the theft of trade secrets and sug-
gested that the discussion was forthcoming in Parliament: 
We provisionally conclude that the main arguments in favour of 
criminalizing trade secret misuse are as follows: 
(1) That there is no distinction in principle be-
tween the harm caused by such misuse and the harm 
caused by theft; 
(2) That the imposition of legal sanctions is nec-
essary in order to protect investment in research; 
(3) That civil remedies alone are insufficient to 
discourage trade secret misuse (and would continue 
to be insufficient if exemplary damages were made 
more widely available), because many wrongdoers 
are unable to satisfy any judgment against them; in-
fringement of copyright and registered trademarks 
but not the misuse of 
(4) That is inconsistent for the law to prohibit the 
trade secrets; and 
(5) That criminalization would help to preserve 
standards in business life.79 
                                                                                                             
 77 Id.; see Theft Act of 1968, c. 60, § 4 (Gr. Brit.). 
 78 BRADLEY LIMPERT & OXANA IATSYK, LIMPERT: TECHNOLOGY 
CONTRACTING: LAW, PRECEDENTS AND COMMENTARY § 2-3(c)(i) (2008). 
 79 GREAT BRITAIN: LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: 
MISUSE OF TRADE SECRETS – A CONSULTATION PAPER 30 (1997). 
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However, these suggestions were not acted upon. The UK also 
proposed changes to the Serious Crime Bill in order to deter hackers 
by increasing the penalty under the Computer Misuse Act to a life 
sentence.80 
4.   AUSTRALIA 
To date, Australia has not decided to follow the example set by 
the United States and criminalize acts of economic espionage. Aus-
tralia relies upon civil and contractual enforcement through “breach 
of confidence” which has its roots in English law.81 Also, as a sig-
natory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), Australia has an international obligation 
under Article 39(2) to protect undisclosed information that has com-
mercial value because it is secret though it has no specific trade se-
cret protection laws on the books.82 
Gillian Dempsey, a lecturer at the Australian National Univer-
sity, argues that despite the lack of protection, Australia’s regulation 
of trade secrets is not deficient.83 Dempsey tends to agree with her 
New Zealand counterpart that “[i]n a modern economy, production 
tends to be characterized by alliances between firms” in order to cut 
down on R&D costs and therefore alliances and sharing with firms 
“already possessing the requisite complementary knowledge” can 
be an “efficient manner of solving a problem involving specialist 
knowledge.”84 Criminalizing the theft of trade secrets may reduce 
any incentive a company might have to cooperate and share with 
others.85 
Moreover, Dempsey argues that companies should be responsi-
ble for their own security interests and should not burden the gov-
ernment with these sorts of costs. 
                                                                                                             
 80 Lee Munson, Hackers Who Threaten National Security Could Face Life 
Sentences, NAKED SECURITY (Oct. 24, 2014), https://nakedsecurity.so-
phos.com/2014/10/24/hackers-who-threaten-national-security-could-face-life-
sentences/. 
 81 Gillian Dempsey, Industrial Espionage: Criminal or Civil Remedies, 
AUSTL. INST. CRIM., Mar. 1999, at 1, 3–4. 
 82 1 RICHARD GOUGH, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 2:2 
(West 2014). 
 83 Dempsey, supra note 81, at 4. 
 84 Id. at 5. 
 85 See id. 
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[T]o argue for criminalization would involve an im-
plicit assumption that the interest of the firm is con-
current with the interest of society as a whole. The 
costs of detection and policing are likely to be rela-
tively higher in a criminal arena than in a civil 
arena. . . . And the policing agency would have to 
acquire sufficient experience and knowledge in in-
formation security and evidence gathering tech-
niques in a market where such knowledge is at a pre-
mium.86 
In Dempsey’s argument, only the company whose trade secrets 
are being protected would benefit, and the rest of society, in contrast, 
would suffer the “disastrous” consequences on “innovation and 
competitiveness.”87 
5.   JAPAN 
Japan is thoroughly aware of the economic espionage problem. 
Nissan acknowledged it might have been hacked in April 2012 when 
they detected the presence of a computer virus on their network, and 
they believed user IDs and passwords had been transmitted to hack-
ers who “were looking for intellectual property related to its EV 
drivetrains.”88 “Japan’s Finance Ministry . . . uncovered evidence of 
a major Trojan cyber-attack on its computer systems [in order to 
steal confidential information in 2010 and 2011 that remained] un-
detected for almost two years.”89 
In 2012, “three IT executives were arrested in Japan for . . . al-
legedly us[ing] Android malware to ‘earn’ themselves over 20 mil-
lion yen90 from unsuspecting victims” that downloaded a video 
                                                                                                             
 86 Id. at 6. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Shane McGlaun, Nissan Gets Hacked, Target Could’ve Been Intellectual 
Property, DAILY TECH (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.dailytech.com/Nissan+
Gets+Hacked+Target+Couldve+Been+Intellectual+Property/article24527.htm. 
 89 John Dunn, Japan’s Finance Ministry Uncovers Major Trojan Attack, 
CSO ONLINE (July 24, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/711878/japan-s-
finance-ministry-uncovers-major-trojan-attack. 
 90 Twenty million yen is equivalent to approximately half a million U.S. dol-
lars. 
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playing application.91 “Once downloaded and run, it would badger 
the users by requesting them to pay a 99,800 yen (around $1,256) 
fee every few minutes, in addition to stealing their personal data and 
storing it on a remote server for future use.”92 Japan had recently 
introduced a law that makes malware creation and distribution a 
criminal act.93 
Japan has taken several steps to improve its efforts to counter 
industrial espionage. Prior to 2009, the government was required to 
prove that the trade secret theft resulted in profits for a third party 
beneficiary.94 Japan has since revised its Unfair Competition Pre-
vention Law so that it need only prove that the person committing 
industrial espionage took information from a company without per-
mission.95 In 2014, the Japanese government formed a committee 
made up of government and company executives to discuss ways to 
prevent trade secret theft and improve communication between gov-
ernment investigators and private companies.96 Before this commit-
tee, there had been little coordination and information sharing be-
tween investigative authorities and companies, and investigators 
were unable to start an investigation unless a company filed a com-
plaint.97 Japanese executives are reticent to disclose any type of theft 
as that would mean they would have to take full responsibility for 
the loss and “reporting may cause further time commitments and 
expenses.”98 
It must also be said that Japan has been known to conduct its 
own economic espionage. Japanese industry is promoted by its own 
government; the Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI) 
uses the Japan External Trade Office (JETRO) to collect economic 
                                                                                                             
 91 Zeljka Zorz, Six Arrested for Peddling Android Malware in Japan, NET 
SECURITY (June 18, 2012), http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?
id=2147. 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Gov’t Eyes Panel to Share Info on Industrial Espionage, THE DAILY 
YOMIURI, Jan. 15, 2014. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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and trade information.99 JETRO, interestingly enough, offers free 
commercial space and free communications to foreign companies in 
downtown Tokyo.100 
6.   LATIN AMERICA 
Latin America has also been facing an upsurge in cybercrime. 
According to a 2013 report by Trend Micro and the Organization of 
American States (OAS), cyberattacks increased between “8 to 40 
percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.”101 “A lack of cyber-
crime laws, economic challenges, and unpatched and unprotected 
citizen machines make the region ripe for cybercrime—and the data 
only represents a fraction of the cybercrime incidents there since few 
incidents are even reported or detected.”102 “Attacks on critical in-
frastructure, [industrial control systems, and financial institutions] 
are on the rise.”103 
While Latin America may not have a history of intellectual prop-
erty protection, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 
have “paved the legal road with legislation aimed to protect indus-
trial or commercial confidential information.”104 
III.   THE LEADING OFFENDERS OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
Some of those countries listed in the table that consider eco-
nomic espionage a crime are also some of the greatest perpetrators 
of trade secret theft. Many foreign intelligence services feed their 
pilfered information to domestic companies, thereby giving them a 
competitive edge over other foreign companies.105 “[T]he leading 
                                                                                                             
 99 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT SECRETARIAT, REP. 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 8 (Nov. 15, 2010) 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20102_en.pdf. 
 100 A Free Office in Tokyo, VENTURE JAPAN, http://www.ventureja-
pan.com/fast-track-starting-business-6.htm. 
 101 Kelly Jackson Higgins, Threat Nuevo: Latin America, Caribbean Cyber-
crime on the Rise, DARK READING (May 3, 2013), http://www.darkread-
ing.com/vulnerabilities---threats/threat-nuevo-latin-america-caribbean-cyber-
crime-on-the-rise/d/d-id/1139676?. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See LIMPERT & IATSYK, supra note 78 § 2.3(b). 
 105 Cotriss, supra note 8. 
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state intelligence threats [are said] to be Russia and China, based on 
their capabilities, intent, and broad operational scopes.”106 However, 
there are certainly other players waiting to take China and Russia’s 
place.107 
A.   China 
[T]here are two kinds of big companies in the United 
States[: t]hose that have been hacked by the Chinese 
and those who don’t know they’ve been hacked by 
the Chinese.108 
—FBI Director James Comey 
 
China first enacted trade secret “protections” in 1993 with the 
passage of Article 10 of the Unfair Competition Law, which prohib-
its businesses from the following: 
a) obtaining the trade secret of the rightful party by 
theft, inducement, duress or other illegal means; b) 
disclosing, using or allowing others to use the trade 
secrets of the rightful party obtained by illegal 
means; or c) disclosing, using or allowing others to 
use trade secrets in breach of an agreement or the 
                                                                                                             
 106 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hear-
ing Before Senate Armed Services Comm., 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (statement for 
the record of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC
_FINAL.pdf. 
 107 “A growing number of computer forensic studies by industry experts 
strongly suggest that several nations—including Iran and North Korea—have un-
dertaken offensive cyber operations against private sector targets to support their 
economic and foreign policy objectives, at times concurrent with political crises.” 
Id. at 1. 
 108 Pelley, supra note 52. China denies that it targets U.S. companies. “[PRC] 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin reportedly said in a statement that 
China’s rapid ascendancy in terms of its military and space achievements are not 
down to cyber espionage but the ‘pioneering, innovative and devoted work’ of the 
Chinese people.” Phil Muncaster, China Hits Back at U.S. Cyber Snooping Alle-
gations, REGISTER (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/04/23/
us_china_spying_satellite/. 
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confidentiality requirement imposed by the rightful 
party.109 
Criminal sanctions, which may include up to seven years of im-
prisonment, may be used if the following three elements are met: 
“(a) gross violation of the rights; (b) serious circumstances; and (c) 
a large amount of illegal income, with heavy losses being suffered 
by the victim.”110 
Despite these so-called protections, China aggressively pursues 
foreign companies’ trade secrets and intervenes to support Chinese 
businesses against foreign competitors. In fact, the National Peo-
ple’s Congress in 2011 approved a five-year economic plan which 
mirrored most of the common targets of Chinese cyberspying: clean 
energy, biotechnology, advanced semiconductors, information tech-
nology, high-end manufacturing, such as aerospace and telecom 
equipment, and biotechnology, including drugs and medical de-
vices.111 China also wants U.S. technology, in particular, to advance 
their own military needs.112 
In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest 
economy.113 One of the main reasons the Chinese economy has 
flourished is due to the fact Chinese companies have been able “to 
skip over [or accelerate] costly and time-consuming R&D and bring 
products to market using U.S. trade secrets, technology and IP.”114 
China appears to use the vacuum cleaner approach—collect it 
all. China has accounted for roughly 50 to 80% of all open economic 
espionage and trade secret theft investigations in the United States 
alone.115 Their common methods of economic espionage can be di-
                                                                                                             
 109 See LIMPERT & IATSYK, supra note 78 § 2.3(e)(ii) (2008). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Riley & Walcott, supra note 11. See also KPMG INTERNATIONAL, CHINA’S 
12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN: CONSUMER MARKETS 2 (2011), http://www.kpmg.com
/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-12th-Five-
Year-Plan-Consumer-Markets-201104.pdf. 
 112 Cotriss, supra note 8. 
 113 Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, China Overtakes Japan as World’s Sec-
ond-Largest Economy, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2011, 1:38 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-econ-
omy [hereinafter China Overtakes Japan]. 
 114 Cotriss, supra note 8. 
 115 COMM’N ON THEFT AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 10, at 15. 
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vided into three categories: (1) hacking; (2) recruiting students, busi-
ness executives, and insiders overseas to steal trade secrets; and (3) 
stealing from businesses who choose to manufacture in or conduct 
joint ventures with China. 
1.   HACKING AND THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 
In the case of China, it is relatively easy to prove the EEA’s for-
eign government/instrumentality/agent nexus. In December 2011, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that the Chinese military sponsors 
most of the Chinese cyberspying.116 “The Chinese cyberspying cam-
paign stems largely from a dozen groups connected to China’s Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army and a half-dozen nonmilitary groups con-
nected to organizations like universities . . . “117 
In May 2013, the Washington Post described a classified report 
by the Defense Science Board, which listed more than 24 U.S. 
weapon system designs the board determined were accessed by 
cyber intruders.118 “[S]enior military and industry officials with 
                                                                                                             
 116 Siobhan Gorman, United States Homes In on China Spying, WALL STREET 
J., (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020433
6104577094690893528130. 
 117 Id. “The Chinese government, primarily through the PLA and the [Ministry 
of State Security], supports these activities by providing state-owned enterprises 
information and data extracted through cyber espionage to improve their compet-
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compromised U.S. companies and those industries designated by Beijing as ‘stra-
tegic’ industries further indicates a degree of state sponsorship, and likely even 
support, direction, and execution of Chinese economic espionage. Such govern-
mental support for Chinese companies enables them to out-compete U.S. compa-
nies, which do not have the advantage of leveraging government intelligence data 
for commercial gain.” Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Modernization and 
Cyber Activities: Testimony of Dr. Larry M. Wortzel Before the House Armed 
Services Committee, 8 Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, 14 (2014). 
 118 Ellen Nakashima, Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs 
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knowledge of the breaches said the vast majority were part of a wid-
ening Chinese campaign of espionage against U.S. defense contrac-
tors and government agencies.”119 
“[C]yberspies hacked into the computer networks of POSCO, 
the South Korean steel giant in July 2006. . . . the same month that 
the steelmaker, the third largest in the world, initiated a takeover of 
a large steel mill in eastern China.”120 Mandiant, a private security 
firm, issued a report in 2014 called “APT1” that accused China’s 
PLA of launching cyberespionage attacks against 141 companies in 
20 industries through a group known as “PLA Unit 61398” operat-
ing mainly from Shanghai.121 “The PLA . . . passes such information 
to Chinese companies . . . so they can rapidly increase their own 
capabilities.”122 
“[PLA] leaders have embraced the idea that successful war 
fighting is based on the ability to exert control over an adversary’s 
information and information systems. The PLA has placed computer 
network operations in a unified framework broadly known as infor-
mation confrontation and seeks to integrate all elements of infor-
mation warfare, electronic and non-electronic, offensive and defen-
sive, under a single command authority.”123 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id. The list included the Patriot missile system, the Aegis ballistic missile 
defense system, the F/A-18 fighter, the V-22 Osprey multirole combat aircraft, 
and the Littoral Combat Ship. Id. 
 120 Riley & Walcott, supra note 11. 
 121 Ellen Mesmmer, Chinese Government Still Sponsoring Cyber-Espionage, 
says FireEye COO, CHANNELWORLD (Mar. 3, 2014), http://specials.channel-
world.in/channel_news/chinese-government-still-sponsoring-cyber-espionage,-
says-fireeye-coo. 
 122 Rick Newman, China May Have Hacked Your Company, Too, YAHOO 
FINANCE (May 20, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/china-has-
probably-hacked-your-company--too-175016269.html. 
 123 Press Release, U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, Chinese Capabil-
ities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage (March 8, 2012), 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/USCC%20Report%20-
%20Chinese%20Capabilities%20for%20Computer%20Network%20Opera-
tions%20and%20Cyber%20Espionage.pdf. “The Chinese military’s close rela-
tionship with large Chinese telecommunications firms creates an avenue for state 
sponsored or state directed penetrations of supply chains for electronics support-
ing U.S. military, government, and civilian industry—with the potential to cause 
the catastrophic failure of systems and networks supporting critical infrastructure 
for national security or public safety.” Id. 
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“Some Chinese hacker groups, including groups affiliated with 
the PLA, will carry out their official missions during the day and 
then hack for profit at night. Other hacking groups will come across 
commercially valuable information as they carry out their official 
espionage tasks, take it, and then sell it for a personal profit to Chi-
nese firms. Economic espionage is a money making activity for the 
PLA, and this increases the difficulty of bringing it under con-
trol.”124 
“China’s leaders describe modernization of the PLA as essential 
to preserving and sustaining what they view as a ‘period of strategic 
opportunity’ to advance China’s national development during the 
first two decades of the 21st century. China’s leaders see this period 
as providing an opportunity to focus on fostering a stable external 
environment to provide the PRC the strategic space to prioritize eco-
nomic growth and development and to achieve ‘national rejuvena-
tion’ by 2049.”125 
2.   STUDENTS AND INSIDERS 
China’s “energetic espionage program . . . began with China’s 
economic opening to the West in the early 1980s and moved into 
cyberspace at least twelve years [ago.]”126 “In 1986, Deng Xiao 
Peng established ‘Program 863,’ a sort of academy of sciences and 
technologies charged with closing the scientific gap between China 
and the world’s advanced economies in a very short period of time. 
                                                                                                             
 124 China’s Military Modernization and its Implications for the United States: 
Hearing Before U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, 113th Cong. 72–81 
(2014) (statement of James A. Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow of Strategic 
Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies) [hereinaf-
ter Lewis Statement]. 
 125 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND 
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2014, i 
(2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2014], http://www.de-
fense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. The PLA’s 
“New Historic Missions” codified in a 2007 amendment to the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) Constitution are to “[p]rovide an important guarantee of 
strength for the CCP to consolidate its ruling position”; “[p]rovide a strong secu-
rity guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategic opportunity for national de-
velopment”; “[p]rovide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national in-
terests”; and “[p]lay an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting 
common development.” Id. at 16. 
 126 Lewis Statement, supra note 124, at 77–78. 
2016] A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 789 
 
The 863 Program and its institutional derivatives not only sponsored 
actual research, they also promoted the acquisition of advanced 
technologies from other countries legally or illegally.”127 The PRC 
uses its citizens studying and working abroad to collect trade secrets 
and bring them back to the motherland.128 
Deng Xiaoping once said, “[w]hen our thousands of Chinese stu-
dents abroad return home, you will see how China will transform 
itself.”129 
In 2009, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission quoted testimony provided by former FBI Special Agent 
I.C. Smith that: 
The Ministry of State Security sometimes places 
pressure on Chinese citizens going abroad for educa-
tional or business purposes and may make pursuit of 
foreign technology a quid pro quo for permission to 
travel abroad. However, this phenomenon of “entre-
preneurial espionage” appears to be particularly 
common among businessmen who have direct com-
mercial ties with Chinese companies and who seek 
to skirt U.S. export control and economic espionage 
laws in order to export controlled technologies to the 
PRC. In such instances, profit appears to be a pri-
mary motive, although the desire to “help China” can 
intersect in many cases with the expectation of per-
sonal financial gain.130 
The greatest attribute of Chinese scholars in the eyes of the PRC 
is their vulnerability to the Communist Party’s control. If bribes and 
                                                                                                             
 127 William Pentland, Entrepreneurial Espionage—Made in China, FORBES 
(Jan. 22, 2011,), http://blogs.forbes.com/williampentland/2011/01/22/entrepre-
neurial-espionage-made-in-china/. 
 128 U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 111TH CONG., REP. TO 
CONGRESS (Comm. Print 2009), [hereinafter U.S.-CHINA REP. TO CONGRESS 
2009], http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2009-Report-to-
Congress.pdf. According to Chinese official’s statistics, in 2000 there were 
190,000 PRC students in the United States. SUJIAN GUO AND BAOGANG GUO, 
THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS 106 (Lexington Books, 2010). 
 129 Robert Lenzer, The China Hand, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2005), 
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 130 U.S.-CHINA REP. TO CONGRESS 2009, supra note 128, at 160. 
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appeals to nationalism do not persuade students to spy for China, 
coercion usually does. Beijing can easily coerce students to cooper-
ate by threatening their visa status, tuition scholarships, future ca-
reer, and even their families living in China.131 
Insider “spies” are also comprised of a significant group of busi-
ness executives who chose to steal trade secrets from their company 
for monetary or ideological reasons. Much of the information stolen 
is dual-use technology, which assists China in rapidly increasing its 
military capabilities.132 In United States v. Chung, an insider’s inter-
action with the Western aviation-manufacturing firm, Boeing, pro-
vided a huge benefit to China’s defense aviation industry.133 More-
over, it is estimated that China has “over 3,000 front companies [op-
erating] in the United States,” some with the sole purpose of facili-
tating technology transfer to China.134 
3.   JOINT BUSINESS VENTURES WITH CHINA 
National industrial policy goals in China encourage intellectual 
property (IP) theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese business 
and government entities are engaged in this practice. “There are also 
weaknesses and biases in the legal and patent systems that lessen the 
protection of foreign [IP while] other policies . . . favor domestic 
suppliers,” particularly in the technology field.135 
                                                                                                             
 131 Id. at 7, 12, 160–66. 
 132 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND 
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2012, 
at 10 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2012], http://www.de-
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tion. In this context, the cumulative effect of U.S. dual-use technology transfers 
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bilities.” Id. 
 133 United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 134 CARL ROPER, TRADE SECRET THEFT, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, AND THE 
CHINA THREAT 81 (2014). 
 135 Eric Chabrow, Panel: Use Hack-Back to Mitigate IP Theft, BANK INFO 
SECURITY (May 23, 2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/panel-hack-back-
or-sorts-to-shield-ip-a-5784. 
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Since the 1980s, Chinese business partners have demanded that 
some sort of technology transfer occur as part of every major busi-
ness negotiation.136 “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been the 
largest source of technology transfer for China.”137 “When western 
aircraft companies create co-production facilities in China, they 
teach Chinese workers how to build planes to western standards.”138 
Any foreign company working within China or conducting busi-
ness with China needs to understand that Chinese intelligence or-
ganizations and other state entities are behind the plots to steal their 
technology.139 Chinese state-owned businesses are among some of 
the largest firms in the world.140 The U.S.-China Economic Review 
Commission Report of 2011 indicated that China’s privatization re-
forms have, in some cases, reversed gains by the private sector and 
the state sector is strengthening.141 The state-owned Assets Supervi-
sion and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the controlling 
shareholder of some 120 state-owned firms, and the SASAC con-
trols $3.7 trillion in assets.142 China’s state-owned enterprises re-
ceive a variety of benefits and include “preferred access to bank cap-
ital, below-market interest rates on loans from state-owned banks, 
favorable tax treatment, policies that create a favorable competitive 
environment for SOEs relative to other firms and large capital injec-
tions when needed.”143 “In fact, the state has the preponderance of 
control over individual cyber rights. This permits the Chinese gov-
ernment to act freely regarding the management of information or 
                                                                                                             
 136 Lewis Statement, supra note 124, at 79–80. 
 137 Id. at 3. 
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 139 Pentland, supra note 127. 
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its monitoring. The Chinese can establish their own rules for any-
thing they claim to own.”144 
Moreover, the theft of trade secrets is not only promoted by gov-
ernment policies and state-backed companies, but it also reflects the 
societal attitude towards intellectual property. “One reason China 
does not have a strong domestic software industry, for example, is 
that no Chinese company can survive the wholesale pirating of its 
products.”145 Microsoft estimates that only one out of every ten cus-
tomers using its software in China is paying for it.146 But conditions 
are improving.147 The percentage of pirated software usage in China 
dropped to 77% in 2011.148 
Guy Sorman, a French journalist who spent two years traveling 
throughout China and interviewing various people, wrote: 
Whether it’s electronics, garments, consumer dura-
bles, or cars, Chinese firms are content to assemble, 
subcontract, or recopy. At times, they respect intel-
lectual property, though generally it is ignored. Pi-
racy is the norm. Enter any shop in China and you 
can get the imitation of any Western luxury or elec-
tronic good at half the price. . . . 
This has become a source of great concern for West-
ern firms. Because this illegal trade is virtual, there 
is no way of controlling it. The ingenuity of Chinese 
piracy knows no bounds. In the summer of 2005, the 
bookstores of mainland China were selling the sev-
enth volume of the Harry Potter series even before it 
had been written by its British author. In defense of 
the Chinese counterfeiter, imitation is part of a long 
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tradition. As far back as the 1660s, the Spanish mis-
sionary Navarrete had observed that the Cantonese 
artisans were “past masters in the art of counterfeit-
ing, selling in China as the genuine article the fakes 
they had copied from the West.” 
. . . The concept of intellectual property has no mean-
ing for Chinese producers, who see it as yet another 
form of Western protectionism. There is a School of 
Intellectual Property at the University of Shanghai. 
Its director, responsible for educating future Chinese 
entrepreneurs, says: “International brands are far too 
expensive. Their high price excludes most of man-
kind from the benefits of the world economy.” In 
other words, intellectual property is theft, and pirates 
are philanthropists . . . . 
Some may argue that Korea and Japan experienced a 
similar phase before they managed to set up systems 
and produce brands of international repute. China, 
too, may replicate the same virtuous cycle. Such a 
development does not seem likely in the near future, 
however. China lacks innovation not because it is a 
new economy but because its institutions do not fos-
ter the innovative spirit.149 
B.   Russia 
While China uses various methods to steal foreign trade secrets 
for both political and economic interests,150 Russia has recently fo-
cused its efforts on cyber espionage to promote its national eco-
nomic interests, while also employing intelligence officers under 
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diplomatic cover.151 A U.S. cybersecurity firm, Crowdstrike, re-
ported this past year that Russia has spied on “hundreds of Ameri-
can, European and Asian companies” to include “European energy 
companies, defense contractors, technology companies . . .  manu-
facturing and construction firms in the United States, Europe and the 
Middle East as well as U.S. healthcare providers.”152 
“Russia’s intelligence services are conducting a range of activi-
ties to collect economic information and technology from U.S. tar-
gets” in particular.153 Because Russia relies mainly on hacking to 
accomplish its goals, it is much more difficult to prove which attacks 
are government sponsored and where the source of the attacks orig-
inated.154 Foreign intelligence services, such as the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service (“SVR”), have used independent hackers as 
proxies, thereby giving the agencies plausible deniability.155 
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 154 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. 
 155 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. In October 2007, Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin asked the new head of Russia’s external intelligence 
service, Sluzhba Vnehny Razvedi (SVR), former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov 
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Despite the fact that cyberattacks from Russia are a distant sec-
ond to those from China,156 there have been a significant amount of 
reports about the damage done by Russian malware. Hackers based 
in Russia gained access to computers in NATO, Western European 
governments, Ukrainian government organizations, energy and tel-
ecommunications companies in Europe, and U.S. academic institu-
tions by utilizing a flaw in Microsoft Windows between 2009 and 
2014.157 The vulnerability, dubbed “SandWorm,” was found in the 
OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) package manager in Mi-
crosoft Windows and Server.158 In this case, “malicious Microsoft 
PowerPoint files would make the OLE packager download addi-
tional malicious files that allowed the attackers to execute com-
mands on the targeted systems.”159 The SandWorm hackers had 
“been operating for at least five years and had been targeting insti-
tutions and individuals considered to work for Russian interests.”160 
Russian government hackers were suspected in 2014 of creating 
malware named “Uroburos” which could “move across machines 
even if they were not connected to the public Internet” and were 
designed to steal files from nation states’ infrastructure, intelligence 
agencies, and high profile enterprises.161 “The Russian connection 
was made after researchers from G-Data discovered plenty of Rus-
sian language strings in the code.”162 “They also found the malware 
was searching for the presence of Agent.BTZ,163 malware used in 
                                                                                                             
to build up the SVR’s economic espionage capabilities. Christopher Burgess, Na-
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14, 2014), http://phys.org/news/2014-10-russia-windows-flaw-spy-years.html. 
 158 Zeljka Zorz, Russian Espionage Group Used Windows 0-Day to Target 
NATO, NET SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.net-security.org/secworld
.php?id=17491. 
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 160 Id. See generally Briefings – August 5–6, BLACK HAT, https://www.black-
hat.com/us-15/briefings.html. 
 161 Brewster, supra note 15. 
 162 Brewster, supra note 15. 
 163 Agent.BTZ was used in a massive cyber espionage operation on U.S. Cen-
tral command that surfaced in 2008 and is one of the most serious U.S. breaches 
to date. Brewster, supra note 15. 
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attacks on the U.S. in 2008, which were said to have been carried 
out by Russian spies.” “The Agent.BTZ attack was initiated when a 
USB stick was deliberately left in a parking area belonging to the 
United States Department of Defense” for an unwitting employee to 
discover and use.164 
Others have been troubled not by Russian hackers, but by the 
rise of the Russian-based Kaspersky Lab. Kaspersky Lab sells anti-
virus and internet security software to millions of people worldwide 
with Microsoft, Cisco, and Juniper Networks all embedding 
Kaspersky code into their products.165 Each time a user downloads 
an application onto their desktop, data is sent to the company’s Mos-
cow headquarters.166 Eugene Kaspersky, its CEO, is one of Russia’s 
richest men and was KGB-trained, used to be a Soviet intelligence 
officer, and is currently aligned with Vladimir Putin’s regime and 
Russia’s Federal Security Service.167 
According to its “State Armament Plan 2011–2020,” the Rus-
sian government decided to reorganize and modernize its entire mil-
itary and has already tripled its defense budget to the equivalent of 
just over $700 billion U.S. Dollars.168 “As a result of Russia’s mod-
ernization initiative, government-funded entities are increasing their 
footprint in the United States by seeking joint ventures with U.S. 
companies and academic institutions that possess sensitive R&D fa-
cilities, dual-use (commercial and military) technologies, sensitive 
proprietary information and classified technologies . . . saving the 
Russian government millions of R&D dollars.”169 
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In June 2010, eleven SVR officers were arrested for illegally ex-
porting high-tech microelectronics from the United States to Rus-
sian military and intelligence agencies.170 “The microelectronics al-
legedly exported to Russia are subject to strict government controls 
due to their potential use in a wide range of military systems, includ-
ing radar and surveillance systems, [weapons] guidance systems, 
and detonation triggers.”171 Alexander Fishenko, founder and CEO 
of Arc Electronics, Inc., a company claiming to produce technology 
for traffic lights and navigation systems, “was also charged with op-
erating as an unregistered agent of the Russian government inside 
the United States by illegally procuring the high-tech microelectron-
ics on behalf of the Russian government.”172 
“In the Soviet Union there was no statutory form of trade secrets 
protection.”173 However, the Russian Criminal Code was amended 
in 2014 to grant such protection. 
C.   France 
France is one country that seems to be at peace with the idea that 
nations can be economic competitors in the global marketplace even 
if politically aligned on other interests.174 Industry and government 
are intricately intertwined in France. During a German television in-
terview, France’s former General Directorate for External Security 
(DGSE),175 Director Claude Silberzahn, admitted publicly that for 
“decades” France has engaged in economic spying on behalf of 
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state-owned industries.176 He stated that in France, “the state is not 
just responsible for lawmaking, it is in business as well.”177 “It has 
been widely reported that France, for example, routinely bugged Air 
France flights and French hotel rooms to obtain economic and tech-
nical information from selected foreign passengers and guests.”178 
Pierre Marion, another former DGSE Director, also admitted in a 
1991 NBC news interview that he implemented an economic espio-
nage campaign targeting American companies in the early 80s.179 
“France is the Empire of Evil in terms of technology theft, and 
Germany knows it,” said Berry Smutny, head of German satellite 
company OHIB Technology, in a 2009 diplomatic cable.180 The 
communique, leaked in 2011, discussed rival contracts for a satellite 
navigation system. Smutny was suspended after the cable became 
public.181 
Currently, Art. 418 of the French Criminal Code prohibits the 
theft of manufacturing secrets,182 and “[l]ike Swiss and German law, 
French law recognizes a specific crime for the communication of 
trade secrets to foreigners or abroad.”183 France has proposed new 
legislation or changes to its existing laws in order to help mitigate 
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 183 Id. 
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the effects of economic espionage.184 “France is also considering a 
public economic intelligence policy and a classification system for 
business information.”185 “France created a 12-person Economic In-
telligence Office in 2009 to coordinate French corporate intelligence 
efforts.”186 
D.   India 
India suffers from incredibly lax laws on spying and intellectual 
property theft. According to one report, “private detective agencies 
[in India] receive more than 10 requests a day by companies to spy 
on their rivals.”187 A survey by KPMG showed that 14 percent of 
Indian companies have been victims of corporate spying, with many 
companies not willing to admit intellectual property had been sto-
len.188 
Cyberattacks coming out of India appear to be a new hybrid of 
sorts because Indian hackers are taking some of their cues from Chi-
nese hackers. For the last few years, a diverse cyberespionage cam-
paign has grown out of India that has targeted a variety of industrial 
entities around the globe, mainly Pakistan and U.S. organizations as 
well as the Norwegian telecom provider, Telenor, and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange.189 Researchers from Norman Security re-
ported on “the so-called Operation Hangover campaign that security 
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experts say appears to be run by an independent cyberespionage or-
ganization-for-hire organization and demonstrates the vast and po-
tentially lucrative nature of cyberspying in the global market.”190 
“The group behind Operation Hangover appears to represent a 
new advanced persistent threat (APT) model” and “possibly impli-
cates a commercial Indian security firm”, thus Indian government-
sponsorship has not been confirmed.191 “Unlike the constant and 
ubiquitous wave of cyberespionage attacks against U.S. interests by 
China, Operation Hangover has more global and for-hire character-
istics,” which makes it more difficult to determine “whether the op-
eration is a nation-state endeavor.”192 
E.   Israel 
A recently revealed NSA document, among many disclosed by 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, shows Israel to be a val-
ued and trusted military ally, but also a country that spies on the U.S. 
and targets U.S. technology.193 The NSA document quoted from a 
2013 National Intelligence Estimate on cyber threats which “ranked 
Israel the third most aggressive intelligence service against the U.S.” 
behind only China and Russia.194 Two reports by Newsweek, pub-
lished in May 2014, on Israeli spying also alleged that the extent of 
Israeli espionage activities in the U.S. was “sobering” and “shock-
ing.”195 According to a 2005 FBI report, Israel has an active program 
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to gather information from within the U.S., which includes recruit-
ment of spies and computer intrusion.196 “These collection activities 
are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems 
and advanced computing applications that can benefit Israel’s arma-
ments industry.”197 One way Israel recruits spies is by encouraging 
Israeli representatives and businessmen to attend conferences and 
defense contracting facilities.198 The idea is to entice American sci-
entists to visit Israel in order to obtain U.S. military and civilian 
technologies.199 
One such American scientist, Stewart David Nozette, worked at 
the White House on the National Space Council before being con-
victed in 2011 for spying for Israel.200 Nozette is speculated to have 
been compensated at least $225,000 for handing over classified in-
formation to Israel.201 The Office of Naval Investigations later 
learned that Israel sold these U.S. trade secrets to other countries.202 
One such trade secret was Phalcon, an early warning aircraft based 
on U.S. licensed technology, which Israel attempted to sell to China 
in 2000.203 Israel also “sold advanced weapons systems to China that 
incorporated technology developed by American companies—in-
cluding the Python-3 air-to-air missile and Delilah cruise missile. 
There is evidence that Israel stole Patriot missile avionics to incor-
porate into its Arrow system and that it used US technology obtained 
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in its Lavi fighter development program—which cost the US tax-
payer about $1.5 billion—to help the Chinese develop their J-10 
fighter.”204 
The recruitment of U.S. citizens for Israel’s spy service does not 
end with scientists. Pentagon intelligence analyst, Lawrence Frank-
lin, gave classified materials to an Israeli Embassy intelligence of-
ficer, as well as American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 
officials, and is consequently serving a twelve-year prison sen-
tence.205 Israel also sent citizens posing as art students to U.S. mili-
tary bases with the intention of gaining physical entry to government 
offices, residences of government employees, and Defense Depart-
ment facilities.206 Many of these “students” were found entering fed-
eral buildings from back doors and parking garages, and most of the 
students had backgrounds in “military intelligence, electronic sur-
veillance intercept, or explosive ordinance units.”207 
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE 
A. Why the U.S. response has been weak 
There are several reasons why the U.S. approach to combatting 
economic espionage is weak: (1) the criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1831, has requirements that are difficult to prove, (2) the sentences 
under § 1831 are minimal, (3) despite being educated on the pitfalls 
of lax cybersecurity and personnel controls, there is a lack of buy-in 
from private industry to cooperate with law enforcement and/or 
tighten office security measures to prevent IP theft, (4) the federal 
government has taken a relatively hands-off approach in assisting 
private enterprise, and (5) other countries do not assist in interna-
tional investigations due to their own weak response or individual 
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attitudes towards intellectual property theft or in some cases, are the 
same foreign countries involved in the theft. 
1. THE WEAKNESSES IN 18 U.S.C. § 1831 
There are several reasons why there have been few economic 
espionage convictions under § 1831, one being the statute itself. The 
EEA contains a difficult element to prove, that is, the foreign gov-
ernment/agent/instrumentality nexus requirement. The government 
must prove that the defendant knew or intended that his actions 
would benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.208 As 
Thomas Reilly, a trial attorney in the Counterespionage Section of 
the National Security Division writes, 
The purpose behind the expansion of the intended 
beneficiaries beyond foreign governments and for-
eign agents is to preclude evasion of the statute by 
foreign governments hiding behind corporate or 
other shell entities. An analysis of proof regarding a 
foreign instrumentality requires a lot of investigation 
into the structure, function, operation, personnel, and 
conduct of the instrumentality and its business and 
relationship with the foreign government . . . This ev-
idence comes in many forms, primarily from a de-
fendant’s own statements and documents, a money 
trail, public records, a mutual legal assistance treaty, 
letters rogatory, evidentiary requests, and expert wit-
nesses who can explain the relationship among for-
eign entities and how the foreign government can 
benefit from the offense.209 
Proving government sponsorship is particularly difficult when 
states “build relationships with hackers to develop customized mal-
ware or remote-access exploits to steal sensitive US economic or 
technology information, just as certain FIS (foreign intelligence ser-
vices) have already done.”210 “FIS and other foreign entities have 
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used independent hackers at times to augment their capabilities and 
act as proxies for intrusions, thereby providing plausible deniabil-
ity.”211 Oftentimes, cybersecurity firms can determine the source of 
the hack from the IP range and the particular language of the hacker 
code. Chinese attacks are known to be constant and persistent, and 
they come from several hackers in one giant, steady stream rather 
than from one hacker, making it difficult to determine if the attack 
is government sponsored. 
Proof of government sponsorship in the case of China is easier 
to find than with many other countries that attempt to install layers 
of protection between those stealing the secrets and any government 
entity.212 The central government in China has been linked to many 
Chinese commercial entities, and those entities have been “affiliated 
with PLA [“the People’s Liberation Army”] research institutes or 
have ties to and are subject to the control of government organiza-
tions such as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission.”213 
A common defense to economic espionage and theft of trade se-
crets is to attack the statutory requirement that the information stolen 
was, in fact, a “trade secret,” one which the owner took reasonable 
measures to keep the information secret and one that has independ-
ent economic value.214 If the defendant can prove that the infor-
mation was in the public domain or dispute the ownership of the 
information, the defendant may not be convicted.215 
Another common defense is for the defendant to allege reverse 
engineering, which means that the beneficiary did not receive stolen 
trade secrets, but rather others were able to conduct research and 
analyze the product or information and determine how it worked or 
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how it was made or manufactured on their own.216 In these situa-
tions, the government must attempt to show that “the defendant ob-
tained the trade secret information without the authorization of the 
trade secret owner.”217 
The defense most commonly used is the “tool kit” defense, in 
which the government fails to prove that the defendant intended to 
share proprietary information with someone other than the owner of 
the trade secrets. 218 The defendant alleges that he/she merely wanted 
to download information at work for their own personal knowledge 
for future personal use.219 This defense goes to the heart of a neces-
sary element of prosecution that the defendant intended to convert 
the trade secrets to the economic benefit of someone other than the 
owner. It is difficult to prove this element if the defendant down-
loaded his or her own work so that he/she could use the non-confi-
dential information in the future, and confidential information was 
inadvertently transferred along with non-confidential infor-
mation.220 
The U.S. government has made some improvements to the stat-
ute since the EEA was passed in 1996 to make it easier to prosecute 
these cases. Initially, federal prosecutors working under a U.S. At-
torney would first seek approval to open an EEA investigation from 
the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division of 
the Department of Justice before charging anyone with economic 
espionage.221 Recently, authorization to initiate EEA cases has been 
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streamlined. It is unclear whether the decrease in red tape will have 
a significant impact in the rise or decline of open economic espio-
nage cases. Several suggestions to improve the ease of prosecution 
under the EEA have arisen to include enacting a companion federal 
civil cause of action,222 proposing both civil and criminal penalties 
for the failure to report the theft and establishing a whistleblower 
defense to encourage parties to report suspected thefts,223 focusing 
on corporate accountability and employee awareness rather than 
prosecution,224 and more carefully calibrating the EEA to the im-
portant societal IP interests at stake.225 
2. LACK OF PUNISHMENT UNDER 1831 
Federal judges have been less than uniform in their opinions and 
views on economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and the penal-
ties that should be meted out for those offenses. One judge sent a 
definitive message to China by giving one Chinese spy, Greg 
Chung, nearly 16 years’ imprisonment and exclaimed at the sentenc-
ing, “[s]top sending your spies here.”226 In another theft of trade se-
cret case in Tennessee, the district court felt the circumstances did 
not warrant incarceration and gave both defendants four months’ 
home confinement and a $1,000 fine.227 
                                                                                                             
Division must provide personal approval in order for the United States to file a 
charge under EEA. 
 222 Kelley Clements Keller & Brian M.Z. Reece, Economic Espionage and 
Theft of Trade Secrets: The Case for a Federal Cause of Action, 16 TUL. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
 223 David Orozco, Amending the Economic Espionage Act to Require the Dis-
closure of National Security-Related Technology Thefts, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 877, 
881–82 (2013). 
 224 Brittani N. Baldwin, Keeping Secrets: An Alternative to the Economic Es-
pionage Penalty enhancement Act, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 45, 46 
(2013). 
 225 Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the Information Age: Upgrading 
the Economic Espionage Act After United States v. Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON 
REG. 189, 191–92 (2013). 
 226 Judge Carney at the sentencing hearing of Greg Chung on Feb. 8, 2010 
where Chung was sentence to 188 months imprisonment. Press Release, U.S. At-
torney’s Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal. Release No. 10-027, Former Boeing Engineer 
Sentenced to Nearly 16 Years in Prison for Stealing Aerospace Secrets for China 
(Feb. 8, 2010). 
 227 In late 2011, the company announced that MESNAC Co. of China was 
taking a 100 percent equity position. Bill Brewer, Wyko Tire Technology Sold to 
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Federal judges have shown a distinct bias in handing out mini-
mal sentences for economic espionage or intellectual property theft 
compared to cases dealing with “typical” espionage, i.e., theft of un-
classified intellectual property versus classified information. The 
penalty for espionage can be death or life in prison,228 whereas eco-
nomic espionage and theft of trade secrets provide maximum penal-
ties of 15 and 10 years respectively.229 Spies who steal classified 
secrets frequently receive maximum sentences under the guidelines, 
whereas spies who steal trade secrets receive light sentences under 
the guidelines, typically a few years or substantially less. The table 
below reflects the disparity in sentencing in cases involving spies 
who steal classified information working on behalf of a foreign 
power, compared to the light sentences handed out to defendants in 
cases dealing with theft of trade secrets.230 Either federal judges are 
unaware of the dire ramifications of economic espionage to national 
security, or they believe theft of trade secrets is less heinous and 
more defensible than traditional espionage. 
  
                                                                                                             
China Co., KNOXVILLE NEW SENTINEL (Dec. 1, 2011, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.knoxnews.com/business/wyko-tire-technology-sold-to-china-com-
pany. Clark Roberts and Sean Howley were arrested March 6, 2009. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Two Indicted for Conspiring 
to Steal Trade Secrets from Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Mar. 6, 2009). 
They were both convicted on December 9 2010 for one count of conspiracy to 
commit trade secret theft, one count of trade secret theft, one count of unlawful 
photographing of trade secrets, three counts of transmittal of trade secrets, one 
count of possession of trade secrets, two counts of wire fraud and one count of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
Public Affairs, Two Engineers Found Guilty of Stealing Goodyear Trade Secrets 
(Dec. 9, 2010). The District Court sentenced both men to four years probation, 
four months home confinement, and 150 hours of community service. See United 
States v. Howley, 707 F.3d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 2013). On June 3, 2013, Howley 
and Roberts were resentenced to four years probation and 150 hours of commu-
nity service. Both men, who were originally sentenced in 2011, have already com-
pleted community service. Howley and Roberts also served four months home 
confinement as part of their original sentence, and paid a $1,000 penalty. 
 228 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
 229 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2012). 
 230 See table for comparison. 
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Year Spy Country Secret Sentence 
1977 
Christopher John 
Boyce & Andrew 
Daulton Lee 
USSR 
Highly sensitive data relat-
ing to U.S. satellite systems 
Boyce: 40 years im-






Technical manual relating to 
one of America’s most im-
portant spy satellites 






Became a mole at the behest 
of the KGB; sold CIA se-
crets 





Information relating to a 
“Top Secret” U.S. communi-






Large amount of military re-
lated technology  
8 years imprisonment 
1985 










Spied for nine years and 
handed over comprehensive 
blueprints of U.S. collection 
operations against the Rus-
sians including the identities 




FBI special agent 
USSR 
Over 6,000 pages of classi-
fied documents on sensitive 
national security programs, 
including the details of U.S. 
nuclear war defenses. Also 
revealed the identities of 
Russian agents working for 





lyst for DIA 
Cuba   
25 years 
imprisonment231 
                                                                                                             
 231 The information in this table is from DEF. PERSONNEL SECURITY RES. 
CENTER, ESPIONAGE AND OTHER COMPROMISES OF NATIONAL SECURITY: CASE 
SUMMARIES FROM 1975 TO 2008 (2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/esp-summ.pdf. 
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The bias and contrast between how federal judges sentence those 
who steal classified information versus unclassified trade secrets is 
similar to the disparity and contrast between the sentences handed 
out for cases involving violent criminals versus white collar crime 
offenders. 
According to the United States Sentencing Commission, the av-
erage prison sentence length (not actual time served) every year 
from 1991 to 2001 for white-collar and corporate criminals was be-
tween 19.0 and 20.8 months. During the same period, however, vi-
olent offenders’ and drug offenders’ sentences ranged from 89.5 to 
106.7 months and 71.7 to 88.2 months, respectively. Often, white-
collar criminals have been given lighter sentences than petty rob-
bers.232 
When comparing economic espionage sentences to federal vio-
lent crime sentences, we also see a trend towards harshly penalizing 
offenders of violent crimes much more than economic spies. Per-
haps this is because economic espionage tends to look more like a 
white collar crime and white collar crime is treated more softly than 
violent crime.233 
3. PRIVATE INDUSTRY INDIFFERENCE 
One of the main reasons why there are so few economic espio-
nage convictions in the U.S. is the lack of buy-in from the private 
sector. Currently, companies are not legally required to report a loss 
of sensitive information or a remote computer intrusion to the 
                                                                                                             
 232 J. Scott Dutcher, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications 
for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1300, 1301–02 (2005) (“While the robber with the fountain pen often causes much 
more economic harm than the man with the six-gun, the fountain-pen robber has 
traditionally been treated less harshly. Historically, white-collar crime in the 
United States has been punished very lightly in comparison to violent crimes 
where the victim is physically injured or put at risk to be physically injured. “In 
the federal system, the argument that white-collar offenders receive shorter sen-
tences than street criminals who commit proportional crimes has strong empirical 
backing”). 
 233 Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
485, at 487–88 (1998-1999) (“One study, which examined violations by Fortune 
500 corporations over a two-year period, found that corporate executives were 
convicted in only 1.5% of all enforcement actions”). 
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FBI.234 Private companies fear the disclosure that their trade secrets 
have been stolen may impact their shareholders’ and the public’s 
view of the health and stability of the company due to the theft. How 
will the theft impact the stock price? Announcing a security breach 
of this nature could tarnish a company’s reputation and endanger its 
relationships with investors, bankers, suppliers, customers, and 
other stakeholders. 
The result is few companies disclose the theft. “Google an-
nounced in 2010 that China-based hackers had raided its networks,” 
and stolen its source code.235 At the same time, at least thirty-four 
other companies were also victims of the same cyberattack, but only 
two, Intel and Adobe Systems, Inc. admitted to being hacked.236 
Companies also fear that the trade secret may be disclosed in 
court, thus further devaluing their work. This fear is unfounded since 
the EEA contains a special provision in section 1835 to protect 
against the disclosure of specific trade secret information through-
out criminal proceedings, which includes discovery, pre-trial, and 
trial proceedings.237 The judge issues a protective order precluding 
either side from mentioning trade secret specifics.238 
Another reason for the lack of prosecutions lies in the fact that 
oftentimes, it can take a company years to learn the technology was 
                                                                                                             
 234 The Defense Security Service currently requires cleared defense contrac-
tors to report any IP theft to the FBI. Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Anal-
ysis of Cleared Industry Reporting, DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE 10 (2013), 
http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2013%20Unclass%20Target-
ing%20US%20Technologies_FINAL.pdf 
 235 Riley & Walcott, supra note 11. 
 236 Riley & Walcott, supra note 11. “I can’t find an organization, an entity, a 
business, or a department that hasn’t suffered from cyber intrusions.” Piore, supra 
note 11 (quoting Gordon M. Snow, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 237 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2012). 
 238 Id. 
“In any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter 
such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to 
preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and all other applicable laws. An interlocutory appeal by the United States shall 
lie from a decision or order of a district court authorizing or directing the disclo-
sure of any trade secret.” Id. 
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stolen.239 A company may only learn of the theft when a foreign 
competitor puts out the very same product at a significantly reduced 
price. The loss of this technology can come from a trusted insider or 
from a computer intrusion. According to Mandiant, an American cy-
bersecurity firm, it takes an average of 229 days for organizations to 
discover their breach.240 In 2013, only 33% of organizations self-
detected a breach compared to 37% in 2012.241 
American businessmen and women have also demonstrated a 
certain apathy towards economic espionage, almost arguing that, 
while it is unfair, it is inevitable. Perhaps the act of stealing trade 
secrets hits too close to home, e.g., the “tool kit” defense (“I’m col-
lecting work information for my own future, personal use”), which 
seems reasonable and understandable. “A recent survey by the 
Ponemon Institute and Symantec showed that close to 60 percent of 
employees who have resigned or been terminated admit they stole 
company data.”242 And “less than 3 percent of all information tech-
nology and security dollars are spent to safeguard electronic or hard 
copy corporate information.”243 Moreover, if companies spent sig-
nificant amounts of money on cybersecurity and the company is, in 
fact, never hacked or information never stolen, then business exec-
utives are left answering to shareholders as to why they spent so 
much money with no tangible benefit. This motivates executives to 
risk the cyber threat and spend the money on other business needs. 
                                                                                                             
 239 Moreover, when companies identify the theft, “it is . . . difficult to assign 
an economic value to some types of stolen information . . . . [F]or example, it 
would be nearly impossible to estimate the monetary value of talking points for a 
meeting between officials from a [U.S.] company and foreign counterparts.” 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. 
 240 MANDIANT, 2014 THREAT REPORT: BEYOND THE BREACH 1 (2014). 
 241 MANDIANT, supra note 240, at 1. “Previously ‘the No. 1 priority was to 
protect the operational security of the investigation and the prosecutive equities 
on the criminal side.’ While those goals are still important, ‘it’s even more im-
portant that the victims understand they have been victimized.’” Piore, supra note 
11 (quoting Jonathan Pollet, the founder of Red Tiger Security in Houston). 
 242 Employers: Keep your trade secrets secret, BUS. LEGAL RESOURCES (Au-
gust 27, 2013), http://hr.blr.com/HR-news/Staffing-Training/Employment-
Contracts/Employers-Keep-your-trade-secrets-secret. See also Keep Your Secrets 
Locked Up Tight, HR NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://inshaiimtprofessionalcol-
lege.blogspot.com/2011/04/keep-your-secrets-locked-up-tight.html. 
 243 Id. 
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While some believe U.S. economic success hinges on innovation 
and new technology, along with certain proprietary protections pro-
vided to the innovators in compensation for the risks they take, oth-
ers feel the U.S. is an open society and intellectual property should 
be shared with the world at large for the benefit of mankind. A case 
in point is that of J. Reece Roth, Professor Emeritus at the University 
of Tennessee in the Engineering Department and project manager, 
who was hired to develop plasma based aerodynamic controls for 
use in small unmanned aerial vehicles and guided munitions, and 
was convicted of violating the Arms Export Control Act in 2011.244 
Roth had hired a Chinese national and Iranian national as graduate 
students to work on a top secret military project after signing a con-
tract specifically stating that no foreign persons were permitted to 
work on the project.245 
Companies have always gathered their own intelligence—exam-
ples include looking at a competitor’s prices, soliciting feedback 
from customers, conducting surveys or public views on competitor 
practices and product value, etc. While most business “executives 
would agree that protecting a company’s confidential data and trade 
secrets from the prying eyes of competitors is critical,”one study of 
senior IT security executives “revealed that 65 percent [of execu-
tives] are aware that their company has experienced a computer in-
trusion in which data was stolen, and 55 percent have discovered a 
current employee or insider taking information from the company’s 
computer system to use in a competing business.”246 This leads one 
to believe corporate theft may be prevalent, but apparently it is not 
enough of a concern to spend significant time and resources to fix 
the problem. 
                                                                                                             
 244 Tom Chester, Feds Investigating Retired UT Professor, KNOXVILLE NEWS 
SENTINEL (July 11, 2006), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local-news/feds-in-
vestigating-retired-ut-professor. See generally United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d 
827 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 245 United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 246 What Are The Top Security Concerns of Senior IT Executives?, NET 
SECURITY (June 4, 2014), http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=16955 
[hereinafter Top Security Concerns of Senior IT Executives]. According to Gor-
don M. Snow, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, “We have to have a 
cultural shift in the nation where we understand that there is no secure system, 
that people are going to be hacked.” Piore, supra note 11. 
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There is a great likelihood that U.S. corporate executives, in par-
ticular, do not understand the full extent of existing cybersecurity 
risks or the employee insider threat. As to cybersecurity risks, a 2012 
Carnegie Mellon University CyLab report revealed that 
corporate boards and executives are taking risk man-
agement seriously but there is still a gap in under-
standing the link between information technology 
(IT) risks and enterprise risk management. This gap 
indicates that boards have a lack of understanding of 
how all business operations are supported by com-
puter systems and digital data and how risks in these 
areas can undermine operations. Less than two-thirds 
of the respondents’ organizations have full-time per-
sonnel in key roles for privacy and security . . . [and] 
Asian boards (76 percent) are much more likely to 
have a board Risk Committee responsible for privacy 
and security than North American (40 percent) and 
European (38 percent) boards.247 
                                                                                                             
 247 Top Executives in Critical Infrastructure Cite Need for Improvement in 
Managing Cyber Risks, EMC (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Top Executives], 
http://www.emc.com/about/news/press/2012/20120516-01.htm. See also Jody R. 
Westby, How Boards & Senior Executives Are Managing Cyber Risks, CARNEGIE 
MELLON U. CYLAB 5–7, 24 (May 16, 2012), http://www.hsgac.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/CYBER%20Carneigie%20Mellon%20report.pdf; En-
ergy, Other Utilities’ Cybersecurity is Weak, U.S. SENATE’S HOMELAND 
SECURITY & GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter En-
ergy], https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/energy-other-utili-
ties-cybersecurity-is-weak.According to the third biennial Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity CyLab survey of boards of directors and senior management, “57 percent 
of energy and utility company executives said they rarely or never reviewed se-
curity program assessments. The energy sector and other utilities ranked lowest 
among industries in security management of their cyber assets.” Energy, supra. 
“The U.S. generally believes it is the global leader in security, but the survey re-
sults indicate that North American boards lag behind European and Asian boards 
in undertaking key activities associated with privacy and security governance 
such as regular reviews involving annual budgets, roles and responsibilities, and 
top-level policies.” Top Executives, supra. 
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As Richard Clarke once suggested, are U.S. businesses waiting 
for a “cyber Pearl Harbor”248 to occur before addressing the prob-
lem? 
4. THE WEAK RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
The United States has been labeled “hypocritical” in that the 
U.S. government has been accused of authorizing intelligence gath-
ering against allies and enemies alike while at the same time Con-
gress has made economic espionage illegal. This comment was es-
pecially made after Edward Snowden disclosed the depth of the Na-
tional Security Agency’s (“NSA”) surveillance capabilities in June 
of 2013, and countries began to justify their own espionage activities 
by arguing “you do it too” and “we’re just trying to keep up.”249 In 
fact, after the Snowden disclosures, experts in counterintelligence 
                                                                                                             
 248 At a Milken Institute conference in 2014, Richard Clarke, CEO of Good 
Harbor Security Risk Management and a former U.S counterterrorism official, 
stated, “What companies have to realize is, while we’re waiting for a cyber Pearl 
Harbor that may become a national problem, companies have a problem every 
day . . . What you’re losing every day is intellectual property, research and devel-
opment, and business intelligence, and you’re losing money because they create 
accounts payable and send money offshore.” Rick Newman, China May Have 
Hacked Your Company, Too, YAHOO FINANCE (May 20, 2014), http://finance.ya-
hoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/china-has-probably-hacked-your-company--too-
175016269.html. 
 249 China argues that the U.S. is the nation state leading the cyberwar, and it 
needs to do more to protect itself in the coming years. J. Nicholas Hoover, NSA 
Chief: China Behind RSA Attacks, DARK READING (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:12 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/security/232700341; NSA 
Chief: Chinese Steal a “Great Deal” of Military-Related Intellectual Property, 
and Were Responsible for Last year’s Attacks on Cybersecurity Company RSA, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 27, 2012); The Liberation Army Daily, an unofficial 
but well-vetted source, issued a report, which stated, “The U.S. military is has-
tening to seize the commanding military heights on the Internet, and another In-
ternet war is being pushed to a stormy peak . . . .Their actions remind us that to 
protect the nation’s Internet security, we must accelerate Internet defense devel-
opment and accelerate steps to make a strong Internet army.” Paul Rosenzweig, 
Beware of Cyber China, HOOVER INSTITUTION (March 15, 2012), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/beware-cyber-china. 
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reported “a fivefold increase in physical espionage attempts against 
U.S. businesses” and a threefold increase in cyberespionage.250 
News articles such as those written by Glenn Greenwald, who 
interviewed Snowden in Hong Kong, certainly fanned the flames. In 
one article, Greenwald referenced an email written by an NSA 
spokesperson who claims “‘[t]he department does ***not*** en-
gage in economic espionage in any domain, including cyber,’” yet 
Greenwald pointed out that the NSA has been found to spy on 
“plainly financial targets such as the Brazilian oil giant Petrobas; 
economic summits; international credit card and banking systems; 
the EU antitrust commissioner investigating Google, Microsoft, and 
Intel; and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.”251 
In response to the Petrobas spying allegations, Director of Na-
tional Intelligence (“DNI”) James Clapper stated, “It is not a secret 
that the Intelligence Community (“IC”) collects information about 
economic and financial matters . . . .What we do not do, as we have 
said many times, is use our foreign intelligence capabilities to steal 
the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of—or give intelli-
gence we collect to—U.S. companies to enhance their international 
competitiveness or increase their bottom line.”252 
                                                                                                             
 250 Joshua Philipp, After Snowden, Global Espionage Increased Fivefold, 
EPOCH TIMES (May 30, 2014), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/704132-after-
snowden-global-espionage-increased-fivehold/?photo=4. According to Verizon’s 
2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, “[t]he United States was by far the larg-
est target of cyberespionage, being hit with 87 percent of espionage inci-
dents . . . .South Korea was second, being targeted by 6 percent of attacks.” Id. 
 251 Glenn Greenwald, The U.S. Government’s Secret Plans to Spy for Ameri-
can Corporations, INTERCEPT, (Sept. 5, 2014), https://theintercept.com/
2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-
corporations. See also GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 134–35. “Much of the 
Snowden archive revealed what can only be called economic espionage: eaves-
dropping and email interception aimed at the Brazilian oil giant Petrobras, eco-
nomic conferences in Latin America, energy companies in Venezuela and Mex-
ico, and spying by the NSA’s allies—including Canada, Norway, and Sweden—
on the Brazilian ministry of Mines and Energy and energy companies in several 
other countries.” Id. 
 252 Greenwald cites a DNI-sponsored 2009 Quadrennial Intelligence Commu-
nity Review Final Report (“QICR”) that appears to provide evidence, albeit in-
conclusive, that at a minimum the U.S. Intelligence Community has contingency 
plans to engage in economic espionage under certain scenarios that specifically 
threaten national security. GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 135. See also 
OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE 
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Obviously, the U.S. cannot make economic espionage illegal, 
admonish other countries for engaging in these practices, and then 
do the same in secret. After an exhaustive search looking for evi-
dence that the U.S. government passes on pilfered economic intelli-
gence to aid domestic private business, one can only find allegations 
of collection, but not evidence of an actual transfer of secrets to pri-
vate enterprise.253 Even Glenn Greenwald admits in his book No 
                                                                                                             
COMMUNITY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT APRIL 2009 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL 
REPORT 2009], https://pdf.yt/d/NKHjTMZwaSYhg1KP. The report described 
how “experts from across the [IC], other U.S. departments and agencies, aca-
demia, think tanks, and industry assessed the implications of the year 2025 for the 
IC.” Id. at i. “QICR 2009 developed alternative future scenarios based on Global 
Trends 2025 to explore concepts and capabilities the IC may need to fulfill critical 
missions in support of U.S. national security.” Id. However, “[i]t d[id] not purport 
that any one future will materialize, but rather outlined a range of plausible futures 
so that the IC could best posture itself to meet the range of challenges it may face.” 
Id. 
  In response to Greenwald’s inquiries about QICR 2009 and future plans 
for U.S. government-sponsored industrial espionage—which was contemplated 
under one dire scenario—U.S. officials continue to insist that using surveillance 
capabilities to bestow economic advantage for the benefit of a country’s corpora-
tions is wrong, immoral, and illegal. Yet according to Greenwald, this 2009 report 
advocates doing exactly that in the event “that the technological capacity of for-
eign multinational corporations could outstrip that of U.S. corporations.” 
GREENWALD, supra note 193 (internal quotations omitted). Using covert cyber 
operations to pilfer “proprietary information” and then determining how it ”would 
be useful to U.S. industry” is precisely what the U.S. government has been vehe-
mently insisting it does not do, even though for years it has officially prepared to 
do precisely that. Id. 
 253 “[F]ormer U.S. officials insist the government does not engage in eco-
nomic espionage or intellectual property theft from foreign companies. In part, 
they contend that’s because there is little IP we would want to steal, and to do so 
would undercut our efforts to discourage such theft by other nations. Private U.S. 
companies, meanwhile, would be breaking U.S. law if they hacked into the servers 
of state-owned competitors in places like China and Russia.” Piore, supra note 
11. Joel Brenner, former head of U.S. counterintelligence during the Bush and 
Obama administrations, has said, “The U.S. has an enormous stake in the integrity 
of the intellectual property regime . . . Many of our adversaries don’t believe we 
don’t do this. But it’s really true. We don’t.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
“[T]his apparent unwillingness to retaliate presents an ‘asymmetric disadvantage’ 
that our rivals are exploiting to win an emerging digital cold war.” Id. (quoting a 
digital security expert at the Washington D.C.-based Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies). “The New York Times noted that its surveillance targets of-
ten included financial institutions and ‘heads of international aid organizations, 
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Place to Hide that the National Security Agency (“NSA”) “acts for 
the benefit of what it calls its ‘customers,’ a list that includes not 
only the White House, the State Department, and the CIA, but also 
primarily economic agencies such as the US Trade Representative 
and the Department of Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce.”254 
Espionage is a reality. All countries conduct espionage, and their 
main intention is to collect data.255 This data is collected so govern-
ments may learn of the intentions, capabilities, and motivations of 
other nation states. It would be extremely helpful for any govern-
ment official to learn the strategies of foreign competitors before 
trade and economic talks just as it is important to learn the military 
battle plans of adversaries before an actual engagement of hostili-
ties.256 
                                                                                                             
foreign energy companies and a European Union official involved in antitrust bat-
tles with American technology businesses . . . .’ U.S. and British agencies ‘moni-
tored the communications of senior European Union officials, foreign leaders in-
cluding African heads of state, directors of United Nation and other relief pro-
grams [such as UNICEF], and officials overseeing oil and finance ministries . . . .’ 
When the United States uses the NSA to eavesdrop on the planning strategies of 
other countries during trade and economic talks, it can gain enormous advantage 
for American industry.” GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 138. 
 254 GREENWALD, supra note 193, at 135–36. 
 255 “Allies often suspect each other of economic espionage—underlining how 
countries can be partners in traditional security matters yet competitors in business 
and trade . . . . According to a 2010 press report, the Germans view France and 
the United States as the primary perpetrators of economic espionage ‘among 
friends.’ France’s Central Directorate for Domestic Intelligence has called China 
and the United States the leading ‘hackers’ of French businesses, according to a 
2011 press report.” COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at B–2. 
 256 Hillary Clinton is quoted as saying: “When I would go to China or I would 
go to Russia . . . we would leave all my electronic equipment on the plane with 
the batteries out, because this is a new frontier and they’re trying to find out not 
just about what we do in our government, they’re trying to find out about what a 
lot of companies do and they were going after the personal emails of people who 
worked in the State Department. It’s not like the only government in the world 
that is doing anything is the United States.” Daily Mail Reporter, ‘His Leaks 
Helped Terrorists’: Hillary Clinton Blasts NSA Leaker Edward Snowden, DAILY 




818 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:757 
 
What distinguishes the United States from, say, China, is that the 
U.S. does not steal economic intelligence or foreign proprietary cor-
porate information to benefit American private industry. In coun-
tries such as China, France, Israel, and Russia, where industry is 
promoted by its government and private business has extensive ties 
to the government, there is a strong possibility that any economic 
and trade intelligence collected may be shared with private or state-
owned businesses in those countries to one degree or another. 
The United States government has been given the authority to 
undertake economic espionage under the inherent executive powers 
assigned to the President within Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 
Article II provides that all executive powers shall be vested in the 
President of the United States, and one aspect of this power is the 
authority to conduct espionage for purposes of national security, 
e.g., General Washington authorized the use of spies during the Rev-
olutionary War.257 Typically, this has involved political espionage 
rather than economic espionage. The federal courts, though, have 
not drawn a line segregating one from the other and have been loath 
to limit the President’s use of executive authority when dealing with 
foreign nations and international disputes.258 
With such authority provided, why then has economic espionage 
been abjured by the United States when our allies and competitors 
do it all the time? There are several reasons, including the concept 
of federalism, which creates a distance between the federal govern-
ment and private industry; the U.S. political culture; and the First 
Amendment, which keeps our capitalist economy open for all and 
allows for uninhibited lobbying by domestic and international com-
panies. 
The U.S. government, rooted in federalism principles, is prohib-
ited from acting on behalf of U.S. companies. The national govern-
ment is one of limited and enumerated powers, with states retaining 
                                                                                                             
 257 Madalyn Velie, Espionage Tactics, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT 
VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/espionage-
tactics/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (discussing President George Washington’s 
use of spies). 
 258 See the Chaco Border Dispute that was the basis for United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 3330–31 (1936), and see the Iran 
hostage crisis that was the basis for Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662–
66, 278–79 (1981). 
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residual powers such as registering companies.259 Unlike unitary 
states like the UK or France where companies register with and are 
licensed by the central government, in the U.S., this is done at the 
state level and therefore the connection between companies and the 
federal government is much weaker. Moreover, states are prohibited 
from favoring an in-state company over an out-of-state competitor. 
Under the dormant or negative commerce clause, the Supreme Court 
has prohibited state governments from imposing impediments to 
foreign and out of state commerce, e.g., states cannot favor a local 
dairy or agrarian interest over an out-of-state rival.260 
Second, the United States, more than others, is premised on a 
free market ideology that corresponds with a limited national gov-
ernment. The U.S. government and U.S. political culture see the op-
timal outcome resulting from a free market allocation of resources 
and have chosen, unlike France or China, to not pick “national win-
ners” in industry. Most American government officials do not be-
lieve economic espionage will enrich the nation, but will, most 
likely lead to retaliatory measures taken against American compa-
nies and individuals, which would be harmful because the U.S. re-
mains the world’s superpower with the largest economy in the 
world. 
The United States, as the largest developed economy in the 
world, promotes an open and fair trading system to engender eco-
nomic growth, democracy and international stability; the govern-
ment remains focused on international trade rules, which, other 
things being equal, create the most favorable outcome for American 
industry and workers. As such, the U.S. has sought to lead by exam-
ple and perhaps downplay the occasional loss of intellectual prop-
erty when allies take advantage of our openness. 
Lastly, the United States is part of a global economy where large 
multi-national corporations employ tens of thousands of people in 
dozens of countries worldwide. It would be difficult for the U.S. to 
steal trade secrets from one foreign corporation which perhaps em-
ploys thousands of American workers, share the pilfered intellectual 
property with a U.S.-based company in the same industry, and know 
                                                                                                             
 259 Article I, Section 8, enumerated those limited powers, such as regulating 
interstate commerce, taxing and spending, but not the residual power to assist lo-
cal companies. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 260 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522–22 (1935). 
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with any certainty these actions would not negatively impact the 
U.S.-based employees of that foreign entity. It is no longer clear who 
actually benefits and who is harmed from economic espionage in an 
interconnected global economy. It is possible to help one American 
company only to injure another. For example, imagine if the U.S. 
undertook espionage on behalf of General Motors or Chrysler 
against Volkswagen or Toyota. Although this might seem like a ben-
efit to executives and employees at American car companies located 
in the industrial northeast and Midwest, it would be harmful to other 
Americans, such as workers in Tennessee and Kentucky where 
Volkswagen and Toyota have a large presence. 
Thus, the U.S. system of federalism, capitalism, and individual-
ism, and the fact that the U.S. sees itself as protector of the world’s 
open trading system, best explains why economic espionage is not 
supported or tolerated by the U.S. government except in its current 
limited role, in that some economic intelligence is collected for na-
tional security purposes. 
5. WHY THE GLOBAL RESPONSE HAS BEEN WEAK 
“There’s no country where we have a no-spy agreement.” 
—President Barack Obama261 
 
Espionage is a dirty business. Spies act outside international, tra-
ditional norms in comparison to military maneuvers, which, for the 
most part, follow established international rules. A soldier is given 
the courtesy of POW status when engaging in combat and conduct-
ing operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. A 
                                                                                                             
 261 Zeke J. Miller, Obama: “There’s No Country Where We Have a No-Spy 
Agreement”, TIME (Feb. 11, 2014) (This was President Obama’s response when 
asked at a joint press conference with French President Francois Hollande 
“whether his choice of France for the first state visit of the second term indicated 
a new special relationship that would result in an extension of a so-called ‘no-spy’ 
agreement with the European ally.”), http://time.com/6398/obama-theres-no-
country-where-we-have-a-no-spy-agreement. Hollande responded by saying “he 
and Obama had put the controversy behind them, but said there must be an expec-
tation of privacy for ordinary people around the world. ‘Following the revelations 
that appeared due to Snowden, we clarified things, Mr. Obama and myself, we 
clarified things. And then this was in the past,’ Hollande said ‘Mutual trust has 
been restored.’” Id. 
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spy, when caught, is usually criminally prosecuted or held without 
POW status. 
There is a general distaste for espionage. But economic espio-
nage seems to engender a less visceral emotion, and governments 
are more forgiving in cases of intellectual property theft compared 
to the typical political and military espionage of the Cold War era. 
While political and military espionage seems to bring out aggres-
sive, nationalistic tendencies to the forefront, economic espionage 
seems to be tied to a nation’s economic survival, and therefore, 
deemed more “acceptable.” 
There are several factors that might influence a particular gov-
ernment to either support or reject the idea of state-sponsored eco-
nomic espionage. The biggest factor, of course, is money and pros-
perity for one’s people. Historically, as trends go, developing coun-
tries 
manufacture[] lower-technology products and pro-
vide[] lower-technology services for sale to the more 
developed countries. The developed countries, 
meanwhile, close[] entire industries and convert[] 
their labor forces to work on more advanced products 
and services based on newly invented products and 
processes. Prosperity increase[s] as new technolo-
gies dr[i]ve productivity gains and wages r[i]se. 
[Several] [c]ountries [have] moved up the technol-
ogy ladder.262 
However, moving up the technology ladder has become a much 
quicker proposition for some, especially if the trade secrets of one’s 
competitors can be legally or illegally acquired, and so the concept 
of economic espionage is born.263 
Developed countries with advanced intellectual property (IP) 
want to protect, benefit and promote their competitive advantage, so 
these countries enact laws to safeguard IP and reward entrepreneurs 
for sweat equity and taking risks. These laws are necessary, since 
“illegal theft of intellectual property . . . undermine[s] both the 
                                                                                                             
 262 NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 9 
(2013). 
 263 See generally id. 
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means and the incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate, which[, [in 
turn,] slow[s] development of new inventions” and scientific discov-
eries.264 On the other hand, developing countries have no incentive 
to protect what they do not have, and in an effort to catch up and 
become competitive themselves and bring economic prosperity to 
their people, those with a perceived need have little incentive to play 
by the same rules.265 
Governments that are heavily intertwined with private industry 
are more likely to conduct economic espionage for the benefit of the 
private sector. Countries that have a nationalistic view of the 
“global” marketplace, and represent a target-rich environment of ad-
vanced technology for their competitors, tend to have strict IP pro-
tection laws and economic espionage-type criminal statutes. How-
ever, other countries that are just as nationalistic from an economic 
perspective, but have minimal protectionist industrial policies and 
poor legal environments for IP protection, may be among the coun-
tries that either support or condone economic espionage. Developed 
countries that have more to lose from the theft of their trade secrets 
and who value innovation (such as the United States) obviously fa-
vor enforcing and prosecuting economic crimes. 
However, some developed countries, such as Canada and New 
Zealand, countries that have EEA-type legal protections in place, 
have not prosecuted anyone for such crimes; this perhaps may sug-
gest that at least some in those governments believe that such pros-
ecutions actually inhibit innovation and productivity rather than pro-
tect it. Then there is the perspective of many in countries such as 
China, Russia, and perhaps India, where intellectual property theft 
seems to be justified since it ensures a level playing field amongst 
developed and developing countries.266 
In short order, economic espionage begins to look less like a 
moral judgment and more like a different perspective on the rule of 
law. While the U.S. is quick to label other governments as thieves, 
other countries may not consider what they are doing as wrong. Why 
is this so? While the U.S. capitalist system seeks to strongly protect 
property interests, other cultures seem to view intellectual property 
                                                                                                             
 264 Id. at 1. 
 265 See id. at 10. 
 266 THE COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP 
COMMISSION REPORT (2013). 
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through a different lens and are less willing to declare IP a uniquely 
protected right. 
Different conceptions of ownership and types of political gov-
ernance may shape each country’s unique view of the rule of law. 
The U.S. does not have public ownership of private property, 
whereas China has a history of common ownership of property. 
Similarly, the U.S. does not have the collusion between government 
and business like the state-owned industries in France or the possible 
collusion between the oligarchs and the Russian government. 
The concept of individualism may also explain why the U.S. is 
the only nation to have utilized its economic espionage laws to pros-
ecute offenders, whereas countries like Germany and Canada, which 
are more social welfare states, have not. The United States may have 
the strongest protections in the world, but in other countries such as 
Germany, while there is no specific economic espionage statute, 
trade and business secrets are protected albeit in less specific legal 
provisions. 
The U.S. (and the Western world for the most part) tends to cher-
ish individualism (“Be yourself! Set your own standard! Just say 
no!”),267 whereas China and the East tend to value harmony and 
group solidarity (“Fit in with the others! Don’t stick out! Find a way 
to say yes!”).268 These priorities in values demonstrate that China 
would be more willing to condone stealing trade secrets for the ben-
efit of state-owned industry than a country such as the U.S., which 
emphasizes fair competition, individual ingenuity, and innovation. 
Lastly, another reason why the global response to IP theft and 
economic espionage has been so weak is because historically, many 
nations have condoned these activities, including ironically in ear-
lier years the United States. In the 19th century, the United States 
was known for stealing from the British, particularly in the textile 
industry.269 American citizen, Francis Cabot Lowell, moved to Scot-
land in 1811 and secretly stole the plans to the Cartwright loom, a 
                                                                                                             
 267 T.R. REID, CONFUCIUS LIVES NEXT DOOR: WHAT LIVING IN THE EAST 
TEACHES US ABOUT LIVING IN THE WEST 152 (Vintage Books 1999). T.R. Reid 
was the Washington Post Tokyo Bureau Chief and lived in Japan for five years. 
 268 Id. 
 269 See JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN 
AMERICA xi–xiv (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1997). 
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water-driven weaving machine that almost singlehandedly had pro-
vided Britain with a booming economy.270 Lowell then moved back 
to Boston, built a version of the Cartwright loom, and founded a 
town (Lowell) that “provided the first big shock that jolted America 
into the industrial age.”271 
Centuries earlier, the British did the same to the Chinese. The 
British, known for their love of tea, had a plant, camellia sinensis,272 
smuggled out of China and into India.273 In 1848, Robert Fortune, 
working for the East India Company (with ties to the British gov-
ernment), 
‘learned Mandarin, shaved his head, adopted a pigtail 
as worn by Manchus, dressed in local clothes and dis-
guised himself as a Chinese from a distant province. 
He sneaked into remote areas of Fujian and Jiangsu 
province, forbidden parts of China. Fortune managed 
to collect 20,000 plants and seedlings and had then 
transported it to Kolkata [(India)] in Wardian cases, 
small greenhouses which kept the plants healthy due 
to condensation within the case . . . .’ These seedlings 
were planted in Darjeeling and grew into bushes that 
over the time produced the unique tea . . . .’[T]he 
knowledge that he brought back from China together 
with plants were instrumental in what is today a huge 
flourishing tea industry in India.’274 
Now, with the Chinese stealing trade secrets from U.S. business 
entities, we have come full circle, since centuries earlier Chinese 
discoveries and technology were pilfered by the West. Some Chi-
nese believe history justifies their current behavior, especially in 
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 272 “Camellia Sinensis is the Latin word for tea.” Subhro Niyogi, Spy Secret 
Behind Darjeeling Tea, TIMES INDIA (Feb. 7, 2014), http://timesofindia.indi-
atimes.com/city/kolkata/Spy-secret-behind-Darjeeling-tea/arti-
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view of “The Century of Humiliation,” referring to the West’s ex-
ploitation of China since the mid-19th century.275 China was ex-
ploited and humiliated for over 100 years by an international system 
that strengthened their competitors and kept China weak, isolated, 
and divided. So China and its business community believe they have 
a right to do whatever they can get away with to assume their right-
ful place in the world. Some countries see no contradiction or harm 
in stealing the intellectual property of other nations. After all, is it 
not true that everything is fair in love, war and business? 
Self-justification and feelings about the theft of trade secrets 
vary. The severity of the problem is certainly underestimated. Some 
nations and its citizens find theft of trade secrets from foreign com-
petitors acceptable and deemed critical to the stability of their na-
tion’s economy; others find it unacceptable and blatantly illegal. 
Some countries will take extreme measures to improve or ensure the 
survival of their respective economies, even to include the outright 
theft of trade secrets. Regardless of one’s particular view on the is-
sue, the global response to economic espionage has been weak and 
ineffectual. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
In the United States, theft of trade secrets is illegal.276 Competi-
tive intelligence, also known as open-source intelligence, is per-
fectly legal. Every intelligence agency collects sensitive foreign po-
litical, military, technical and economic information. This intelli-
gence is provided to government leaders to aid them in making pol-
icy decisions. In the case of economic and technical information, 
e.g., trade secrets, some foreign governments share that intelligence 
with domestic and state-owned industry providing those companies 
with a distinct unfair advantage over their foreign competitors. This 
is theft of intellectual property, the protection of which is a corner-
stone of capitalism and free enterprise. The U.S. government denies 
stealing foreign trade secrets or intellectual property for the benefit 
                                                                                                             
 275 See Helen H. Wang, ‘Century of Humiliation’ Complicates U.S.-China Re-
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wang/2015/09/17/century-of-humiliation-complicates-us-china-relationship/. 
 276 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2012). 
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of U.S. private industry; however, the U.S. Intelligence Community 
(“USIC”) readily admits acquiring foreign economic intelligence for 
legitimate government purposes. 
In 1996, when former President Bill Clinton signed the Eco-
nomic Espionage Act, the U.S. government identified somewhere 
between 23 and 51 foreign nations, which were targeting sensitive 
U.S. technologies through human espionage and other means.277 
Since then, the USIC’s annual assessment of countries spying on the 
U.S. has climbed consistently to well over 100 foreign countries in-
cluding both adversaries and allies.278 Countries now view national 
power and national security in economic terms, and the key to U.S. 
wealth and economic well being is our trade secrets. Since the U.S. 
is the most technologically advanced country, there is no doubt that 
its intellectual property is being targeted by multiple state-and-pri-
vate actors. 
BlackOps Partners Corporation, which does counter-
intelligence and protection of trade secrets and com-
petitive advantage for Fortune 500 companies, esti-
mates that $500 billion in raw innovation is stolen 
from U.S. companies each year. Raw innovation in-
cludes trade secrets, research and development, and 
products that give companies a competitive ad-
vantage. ‘When this innovation is meant to drive rev-
enue, profit, and jobs for at least 10 years, we are los-
ing the equivalent of $5 trillion out of the U.S. econ-
omy every year to economic espionage,’ said Casey 
Fleming, CEO of BlackOps Partners Corporation.279 
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If the gross domestic product for the U.S. was $16.7 trillion dol-
lars in 2013280 with approximately 116 million full-time workers, 
how many additional U.S. jobs would have been created with an ad-
ditional $5 trillion dollars of GDP? Economic espionage is obvi-
ously a major concern. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. response to economic espionage has 
been relatively weak due to only a few actual convictions; poor re-
porting by the U.S. business community due to its fear of disclosure 
and damage to its reputation; private industries’ lax cybersecurity 
and poor security against insider employee theft; and U.S. private 
sector apathy, or at best, feelings of inevitability that loss of trade 
secrets is merely a cost of doing business. 
While the U.S. values innovation and spends billions281 on 
R&D, the U.S. will more than likely not follow the example of China 
and Russia, or even France for that matter, where government and 
business interests are intricately entwined. The U.S. government 
structure is such that there will always be a separation between gov-
ernment and private industry and its citizens value their privacy suf-
ficiently that corporations would be reluctant to become intimate 
partners with government agencies. What could change this dy-
namic? Economic espionage and the wholesale loss of U.S. intellec-
tual property for one thing. If economic espionage goes unchecked 
in America, this could kill American innovation and the incentive to 
invest in technology, and ultimately lead to the Orwellian predic-
tions discussed in Global Trends 2030, a futuristic study conducted 
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “In 2030, Asia 
will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms 
of global power . . . .China’s GDP . . . is likely be about 140-percent 
larger than Japan’s.”282 “A reinvigorated US economy”—spurred by 
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 281 “For 2008, the most recent year available, the NSF [(“National Science 
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possible US energy dependence—”would increase the prospects 
that the growing global and regional challenges would be ad-
dressed.”283 If the US fails to rebound, “[a] dangerous global power 
vacuum would be created.”284 
U.S. businesses need to become educated, aware, and more pro-
active. Economic espionage and cyberattacks are not going away, in 
fact, it is getting worse.285 Criminal prosecutions and sanctions 
should increase at a bare minimum, as this will send a strong mes-
sage to other countries engaged in state-sponsored theft of trade se-
crets. 
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However, an increase in Department of Justice and FBI re-
sources to investigate and prosecute cases of trade-secret theft, es-
pecially by cyber means, plus enhanced outreach efforts to educate 
the private sector, will be insufficient to blunt the problem of IP theft 
and economic espionage. These efforts are merely putting a band-
aid on an open artery. It is only until the theft becomes personal that 
businesses, employees, and the government will pay attention and 
take it seriously. A more holistic view and overreaching strategy is 
necessary,286 and an understanding of how other nations perceive 
this problem and how they confront it may also prove to be benefi-
cial. The lack of universally acceptable and enforceable norms have 
clearly undermined U.S. attempts to protect trade secrets. It is time 
for the global community, not just the United States, to re-evaluate 
these incredibly damaging activities and take drastic action to enact 
sufficient penalties and sanctions to blunt this economic and na-
tional security problem. 
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